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THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT:
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other
International Human Rights Treaties
David Weissbrodt*andIsabel Hdrtreiter**

I. INTRODUCTION
Because of persecution, civil war, and economic despair,
millions of people flee from their homes and go to live in other
countries where they can stabilize their lives and find a safe place for
themselves and their families. In 1998, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees estimated the number of people fleeing
their home countries to exceed 22 million.' The right to seek and
enjoy asylum is a well established principle in international law.2 It
has, however, been interpreted consistently as the right of the
sovereign state to grant or deny asylum to those within its territory,

Fredrilcson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The authors
wish to thank Morgan Wilson for his secretarial assistance in preparing this article.
"" LL.M. University of Minnesota 1998; student, Humboldt - Universitat, Berlin.
The authors wish to thank Dr. Bostjan M. Zupandi for his encouragement and
advice in the preparation of this article. See also Johanne Levasseur, La
Protectioncontre l'Expulsion ou le Refoulement dans les Instruments interdisant
la Torture/les Traitemants Inhumains ou Degradants (unpublished, Graduate
Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, 1997).
UNHCR & Refugees: UNCHR by Numbers (visited Nov. 13, 1998)
<http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/table1.htnl>.
2 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, Art. 14, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A (Ill), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess. (Resolution, part 1), at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. L INT'L L. SuPp. 127 (1949) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
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rather than the absolute right of the individual to be granted asylum?
At the same time, the principle of "non-refoulement"
guarantees that individuals have the right not to be forcibly returned
to countries where they face persecution.4
The idea of nonrefoulement was expressed for the first time in Article 3 of the 1933
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees.' The
parties to that treaty committed themselves not to return refugees
"across the frontiers of their country of origin ...unless dictated by
national security or public order."6
In 1951, the principle of non-refoulement was adopted in
Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Convention on Refugees).7 That provision has served both as a
model and textual basis for many subsequent human rights treaties
that have incorporated the principle of non-refoulement. Today
nearly all countries are party to at least one international agreement
that binds them to the principle of non-refoulement'

3

For example, 2

ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 et seq. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972); see also Roman

Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in InternationalLaw, 5 DUKE J.C.I.L. 1,
4 (1994).
4 The term "refouler" was adopted from the French and it means literally to drive
back or to repel. "Refoulement" originally only referred to the return of people
who entered the territory of the receiving state illegally, GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL,
THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press ;
New York : Oxford University Press, 1996). In the sense used in this article,
however, it covers all measures by which a person is physically transferred to
another country in which he or she faces persecution.
5 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 118.
6
159 L.N.T.S. 199 (enteredintoforce July 26, 1935) [official text in French].
7 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.2/108 (1951), 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered intoforce 22 April 1954)
[hereinafter Convention on Refugees].
8 To date only 19 of the 185 Member States of the United Nations are not party
to any agreement that provides for non-refoulement. These States are: Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan,
Palau, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates,
and Vanuatu.
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Although the principle has been recognized in many
international human rights treaties and several scholars have
considered it a norm of customary international law,9 the precise
scope of protection afforded by the different provisions has not been
well defined. Variants include the characteristics of the individual
to be granted protection, the criteria for assessing the risk of
persecution the applicant faces in the country of return, and the limits
of protection from refoulement. Since some of the provisions are
more protective on certain points than others, an individual's claim
for protection from refoulement depends greatly on the treaties to
which the receiving country is a party. Ideally, the merits of the
claim should depend mainly on the risk the applicant would face in
the country of return. In the current situation, the applicant's fate
often depends more on which treaty the receiving country has ratified.
The claims of two persons in different countries may have different
outcomes, even if they face the same degree of risk in their countries
of return.
The specific non-refoulement provision in Article 3(1) of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment"0 (Convention Against Torture) is the main focus of this
' Patricia Hyndman, Asylum andNon-Refoulement: Are These ObligationsOwed
to Refugees Under InternationalLaw?, 57 PHILLIPINE L.J. 50 (1982); GUNNEL
STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT: THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
REMOVAL OF REFUGEES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ARTICLES 32 AND 33 OF THE
1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 188 (Uppsala: Iustus
Forlag, 1989). Walter Kin suggests that the principle of non-refoulement has
become a norm of regional customary international law in Europe, Africa, and the
Americas. WALTER K.kLIN, DAS PRINZIP DES NON-REFOULEMENT, DAS VERBOT
DERZURUECKWEISUNG, AUSWEISUNG UND IMSCWEIZERSCHEN LANDESRECHT [THE
PRINCIPLE OFNON-REFOULEMENT,THE PROHIBITIONFROMREJECTION,EXPULSION
AND EXTRADITION OFREFUGEESIN THE COUNTRYOF PERSECUTIONIN INTERNATIYONAL

LAW AND N SWIvSS LAW] 83 (1982). Professor Goodwin-Gill, however, has
questioned even on the regional level whether the practice regarding nonrefoulement has been sufficiently consistent and has been accompanied by the
opiniojurisnecessary to form a rule of customary international law, GOODwINGILL, supra note 4, at 171.
"0 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered intoforce 26 June 1987),

4
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article. Article 3(1) reads:
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or
extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture."
The aim of this article is to compare Article 3 with the nonrefoulement provisions of the following instruments:
(a) the Convention on Refugees (1951) and the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967); 2
(b) the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention) (1953);3
(c) the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention)
(1974);4
(d) the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant) (1976);'"
(e) the American Convention on Human Rights

reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), substantive changes noted in 24 I.L.M. 535
(1985) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
" See id. art. 3.
12
The Refugee Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
adopted 1951, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered intoforce Oct. 4, 1967).
3 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No.
5 (enteredintoforce 3 Sept. 1953), as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11
which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January
1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively.
" The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, adopted 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered intoforce June 20, 1974).
'5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/63616 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered intoforce Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
Civil and Political Covenant].
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(American Convention) (1978);6 and
(f) the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (African Charter) (1981).'"
By analyzing Article 3 and comparing its criteria to those of
the analogous provisions, guidelines for interpreting Article 3 in
accordance with those instruments can be developed. Governments
that have ratified several of the above treaties complain that they are
subject to confusion and somewhat contradictory responsibilities."
This article tries to ascertain how the inconsistencies can be
understood, and proposes, whenever possible, to identify common
attributes in the relevant treaties. This article contains six parts.
Following the present introduction, Part II provides a detailed
analysis of the non-refoulement provision of the Torture Convention
with regard to its scope of protection, limitations, and its means of
implementation. Part HI sets forth a similar analysis for the
analogous non-refoulement provisions in other treaties. Part IV
contains a topical comparison of the treaty provisions. On November
21, 1997, the Committee Against Torture, which is responsible for
supervising the implementation of the Convention Against Torture,
adopted its first General Comment interpreting Article 3.9 Part V
evaluates that General Comment on Article 3 taking into account the
provision's wording, context, objective, and interpretation, but also
the variegated patterns of non-refoulement protections in other
treaties, and suggests ways in which that General Comment might be
improved. Part VI proposes a revised General Comment on Article
3.

16

The American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,

PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/SER. L.

V/Il. 82 DOC.6REV.1 at 25 (1992).
17 Adopted 26 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 5 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
18 B.I.A. Interim Decision 3365, 1998 WL 611753 (August 25, 1998).
'9

See CAT/C/XX/Misc.1 (1997).
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II. PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT UNDER ARTICLE
3 OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides protection
against a very severe form of persecution; it prohibits the return of
applicants to countries where there are substantial grounds for
believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture."0
The Convention entered into force in June 1987 and has 113
States parties to date.2 Its principal basis is Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' and Article 7 of the Covenant of Civil
and Political RightsP -- both of which proclaim that "no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." This idea was elaborated in the Declaration Against
Torture, which was adopted in 1975 and many of its provisions
served as a textual basis for the language of the Torture Convention.24
The prohibition from refoulement in Article 3 of the Torture
Convention, however, does not have any counterpart in the

20

Convention Against Torture, supra note 10, at art. 3 (1). Article 3 (2) reads:
2. For the purposes of determining whether
there are such grounds, the competent
authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable,
the existence in the State concerned of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights.

Id. art. 3 (2).
See Convention Against Torture Signatory Status (visited Nov. 13, 1998)
<http://www.un.org/DeptsfTreaty/fmal/ts2/newfiles/part-boo/ivboo/iv_9.
html>.
22 Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 5.
' Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, supra note 15, art. 7.
24 See David Weissbrodt, Prospects for U.S. Ratification of the Convention
against Torture, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 529, 530 (1983).
21
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Declaration. The principle was inspired by the case law under the
European Convention of Human Rights,' which in turn reflected
Article 33 of the Convention on Refugees. Non-refoulement was
viewed as a necessary addition to the protections provided by the
Torture Convention.
A. Expulsion, Refoulement, and Extradition
The wording of Article 3 of the Torture Convention is based
on Article 33 (1) of the Convention on Refugees. 6 The Torture
Convention forbids the expulsion, return (refoulement), or extradition
of individuals who face the danger of a specific sort of persecution,
that is, torture. Expulsion refers to persons who have entered the
receiving country legally and who are then removed.27 Professor
Goodwin-Gill notes that "return (refouler)" refers to the transfer of
persons who have entered the territory of a state illegally and who
face persecution in the country of return. 8 Hence, in addition to the
expulsion of persons who entered the country legally, which is
mentioned first in the provision, Article 3 also covers the return of
those persons who have entered illegally.
The Torture Convention adds to the terms of Article 33(1) of
the Convention on Refugees that a state should refrain not only from
"expelling" or "returning" persons, but also from "extradition."
Extradition was included with the intention to cover all possible
measures by which a person is physically transferred to another

21

See HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION

AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 125

(1988).
26
Convention on Refugees, supra note 7, art. 33 (1). Article 33 (1) reads, "[n]o
Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular

social group or political opinion." Id.
27 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 117.
28 Id.
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State.29 This inclusion gives rise to potential conflicts between
Article 3 and obligations that the States parties have assumed under
extradition treaties. On this issue two of the principal drafters of the
Torture Convention -- Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius -- suggest
that when entering into such extradition treaties after ratifying the
Torture Convention, it is clear that governments must refrain from
assuming obligations contrary to the objectives of the Convention.
Burgers and Danelius further contend that even previously ratified
extradition treaties may well be construed to have been supplemented
by the non-refoulement exception provided in Article 3. In addition,
however, a reservation or declaration would be permissible as to
Article 3 for a State that does not consider itself bound by the
prohibition of extradition in the Torture Convention, as to previously
concluded extradition treaties.3"
The Committee Against Torture has concluded that the
principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 applies not only to direct
expulsion, return, or extradition, but also to indirect transfer to a third
country from which the individual might be returned to a country
where s/he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."
B. The Scope of Protection
As contrasted with Article 33 of the Convention on Refugees,
that includes various forms of persecution, Article 3 of the Torture
Convention provides for protection from refoulement only for people
who are in danger of becoming victims of torture. Even the prospect
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment does not protect the
applicant from refoulement under the Torture Convention.32 The
original Swedish draft included inhuman and degrading treatment in

29

Id. at 126.

30

Id. at 126-127.

"' Mutombo v. Switzerland, Committee Against Torture, Communication No.

13/1993, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 at 45 (1994).
Kristen Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Viable

32

Alternativefor Asylum Seekers 74 Interpreter Releases 1773, 1774 (1997).
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its non-refoulement provision.33 The drafting committee for the
Convention then expressly limited the protection of Article 3 to
torture, as the most severe form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. It found that while torture could be defined in reasonably
specific terms, the drafters were concerned that they lacked a precise
definition for the latter phrase. They wanted to create a legally
binding norm that could be precisely implemented in the respective
domestic legal systems of the States parties and it was more difficult
to create such obligations with less precise terms such as cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment. 4
Torture is defined in Article 1 of the Convention Against
Torture as the intentional infliction of severe physical or mental
suffering by a person in an official capacity. 35 Although many earlier
31

BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 49.

Id. at 149. Since the General Assembly requested the Commission on Human
Rights to prepare a convention against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment,
however, the drafting committee reached a compromise with the creation of Article
16(1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, id. Article 16(1) provides:
34

Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in
any territory under its jurisdiction other acts
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as
defined in Article 1, when such acts are
committed by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official
capacity ....
35

Convention Against Torture, supra note 10, art. 16(1).
Convention against Torture, supranote 10, art. 1(1) reads:
For the purpose of this Convention, the term "torture" means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on

10
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instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the European Convention, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter,
include a clear prohibition of torture, the Convention Against Torture
is the first one which defines the act of torture. The definition was
inspired by the case law under the European Convention of Human
36
Rights.
Three elements must be shown to make a finding of
"torture."37 First, the person must be subjected to the infliction of
severe physical pain or mental suffering. To qualify as torture, the
pain suffered by the victim must have sufficient gravity to be
"severe." Mental suffering may be caused by acts such as threats of
future harm to the victim or its family; the forceful attendance of the
execution or torture of other persons; prolonged isolation; or
deprivation of food, water, or sleep.38 Similar to physical suffering,
mental suffering must also be "severe" in order to qualify as torture.
Second, the torturous act must have an objective; hence, there
must be a certain intent. The list of purposes in Article 1," is not
exhaustive, but rather an enumeration of the most common
purposes." One might inquire whether the infliction of pain for
purely sadistic motives but without any interest of the State could
qualify as torture. Burgers and Danelius note that even in these
circumstances there is usually also an element of punishment or
humiliation which would bring the act under the definition of Article

discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id. Art. 1(1).
36 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 114-174. For the case law under
the
European Convention of Human Rights on torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment, see infra Part II.C.
37 Rosati, supra note 32, at 1775.
3' BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 118.
39 .See Convention Against Torture, supra
note 35, art. 1.
40
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 118.
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Third, the Convention applies only to acts committed by or
with the consent or acquiescence of an official. Persons who are in
danger of being subjected to intentionally inflicted pain by private
actors are not generally protected from refoulement under the
Convention Against Torture, unless a government official consented
or acquiesced to that abuse. Accordingly, the Convention Against
Torture has a more limited scope of application than other
instruments prohibiting torture and/or refoulement. Part IV of this
article discusses this issue in more depth.
The last sentence of Article 1(1) of the Convention Against
Torture provides that torture "does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions." 2 At
first glance this provision might appear to allow States to legalize
forms of punishment that would otherwise be regarded as torture.43
The drafters intended the word "lawful" to include both national and
international law.44 Hence, a State party may not impose a
punishment that violates national or international law. For example,
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners forbids

Id. at 119. For this reason Ralf Alleweldt suggests that intent should not be
regarded as a prerequisite to establish torture. RALF ALLEWELDT, SCHUTZ VOR
41

ABSCHIEBUNG BEI DROHENDER FOLTER ODER UNMENSCHLICHER ODER
ERNIEDRIGENDER BEHANDLUNG ODER STRAFE: REFOULEMENT-VERBOTE IM
VOLKERRECHT
UND
IM
DEUTSCHEN
RECHT
UNTER
BESONDERER
BERUCKSICHTIGUNG
VON
ARTIKEL
3
DER
EUROPAISCHEN
MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION
UND ARTIKEL
1 DES GRUNDGESETZES

[PROTECTION AGAINST EXPULSION IN THE CASE OF THREAT OF TORTURE OR
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT] 19 (1996).
42

See Convention Against Torture supra note 10; see also supra text

accompanying note 35.
" Burgers and Danelius note that the Convention was intended to strengthen the
already existing prohibition of torture in international law, but not to lead to a
reform of the penal systems of the prospective States parties. Accordingly, they
observed, without the inclusion of this sentence it would have been unacceptable
to a number of States. BURGERS &DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 121.
4

Nigel S.Rodley, The Evolution of the InternationalProhibitionof Torture, in

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

55,64 (1988).
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corporal punishment and keeping prisoners in dark cells.4" Similarly,
the Human Rights Committee has interpreted the Covenant's
prohibition against torture and other ill-treatment to forbid
'
"prolonged solitary confinement."46
C. Substantial Grounds for Believing that the Applicant Would be
Tortured Upon Return
According to Article 3(1), there must be "substantial grounds
for believing" that the individual would be in danger of being
subjected to torture. The test of "substantial grounds for believing"
contains both a subjective and an objective criterion.47 The subjective
element reflects the perspective of the Committee Against Torture4"
in believing that the applicant faces the danger of torture. For
example, in Ismail Alan v. Switzerland,49 the Committee Against
Torture observed that "the Committee must decide whether there are
substantial grounds for believing that [the applicant] would be in
danger of being subjected to torture upon return." The Committee's
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted 30 Aug.
1955, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, Annex I, A (1956); E.S.C. Res. 663C, U.N.
ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by
E.S.C Res. 2076, U.N. ESCOR, 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 1 at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988
(1977).
46
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth
session, 1992), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev.1 at 30
(1994)(visited Nov. 13, 1998) <http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/
hrcom20.htm>.
47
Bostjan M. Zupandid, CAT Art. 3 Criteria for Determining Whether a State
Party is Justified in Expelling, Returning, or Extraditing an Inidividual to Another
State in Which There May or May Not be Substantial Grounds to Believe that He
or She Will be Tortured (unpublished manuscript, 1997).
48 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth
session, 1992), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 30
(1994) (visited Nov. 13, 1998) <http://www.un.edu/humanrts/gencomnu/
brcom20.htm>.
49 IsmailAlan v. Switzerland, Committee Against Torture, Communication No.
21/1995, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16/D/21/1995 (1996).
41
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belief must be objectively based on substantial grounds.
In reaching the conclusion that there are substantial grounds
for believing that the individual faces a danger of torture, the
Committee must assess the particular circumstances of each case."
Such conditions include criteria such as the individual's ethnic
background, his or her alleged political affiliation, and his or her
history of past detention or torture. In addition to the specific
situation of every case, the Committee Against Torture also takes into
account the general circumstances of the country of return. Article
3(2) provides that "all relevant considerations, including, where
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern
of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights"5 ' must be
considered. While evidence of violations may be an indication that
torture is practiced in that country, such evidence does not in itself
give rise to an issue under Article 3. The individual must always
show that he or she is personally in danger of being tortured. 2 Hence,
a person can be returned to a country even if gross violations of
human rights are occurring. Inversely, the Committee may find that
an individual faces danger of torture in a country, although there is no
pattern of human rights violations.53
In several cases, the Committee has taken into account
whether the country of return was a party to the Convention Against
Torture. In Khan v. Canada,' the Committee found that since
Pakistan was not a party to the Convention, Khan's forced return
would not only make him subject to a danger of torture, but he would
also no longer have the possibility of applying to the Committee for
protection. In Alan v. Switzerland the Committee noted that although
Turkey had ratified the Convention, Turkey's status as a party did not
in itself justify the applicant's expulsion to that country, because

' See BURGERS/DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 118.

Convention against Torture, supra note 10, art 3(2).
See Mutombo v. Switzerlancd Committe against Torture Communication No.
13/1993, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 at 45 (1994).
53 See BURGERS/DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 128.
m TahirHussainKhan v. Canada,Committee Against Torture, Communication
No. 15/1994, U.N. Doc. A/50/44 at 46 (1995).
5'
52
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torture was still systematically practiced in Turkey. Accordingly, the
Committee concluded that:
[T]he main aim and purpose of the Convention is to
prevent torture, not to redress torture once it had
occurred, and... the fact that Turkey is a party to the
Convention and has recognized the Committee's
competence under Article 22, does not, in the
circumstances of the instant case, constitute sufficient
guarantee for the author's security."
It must also be noted that the Committee does not consider
whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant
would be torturedifreturned, but rather whether there are substantial
grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being
tortured.' The Convention further relies entirely on the likelihood of
the danger of torture as a future event.' The applicant does not have
to prove that he has been subjected to previous persecution. Past
torture alone will not protect the applicant from return, unless there
are substantial grounds for believing that danger might reoccur. The
applicant to the Committee Against Torture must also show that the
torture would be intentionally inflicted. The applicant however, need
not specify a reason, however, unlike the Convention on Refugees,
which requires that a refugee be persecuted on one of the five
enumerated grounds. 8
Article 3 does not require an applicant to the Committee
Against Torture to carry the burden of persuasion in demonstrating
a danger of torture. The wording of the provision refers solely to
55 Alan v. Switzerland,supra note 49, 115.
56 The test is thus substantially less exacting than that of (a) a "well-founded fear
of persecution" required under Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, see supra Part
II A (1), and (b) a "real risk of ill-treatment" under the case law of the European
Convention, see supraPart II B (3).
57 See Elisa Massimino, Relieffrom Deportation under Article 3 of the United
Nations Convention against Torture, in LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, 1997-98 ANNUAL HANDBOOK 467, 472 (1998).
58 See infra Part III A(l).
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factors that must be considered by the Committee Against Torture or
the authorities of the States parties. 9 The individual merely has the
burden of production, that is, to present information about the danger.
While the applicant must generally appear credible, it would often be
unreasonable and contrary to the intent of Article 3 to require full
proof of the truthfulness of the applicant's proffered information.'
The Committee has been generous in disregarding contradictions and
inconsistencies in the applicants' stories, particularly with
applications of individuals who report that they have been victims of
previous torture. In several decisions the Committee concluded, in
response to statements submitted by the States parties about the
applicants' credibility, that:
[C]omplete accuracy is seldom to be expected by
victims of torture and that such inconsistencies as may
exist in the authors' presentation of the facts are not
material and do not raise doubts about the general
veracity of the authors' claim.6
In Khan v. Canada, the Committee further noted that such
contradictions are not uncommon for victims of torture, but "even if
there could be some doubts about the facts as adduced by the author,
it must ensure that his security is not endangered."'62
Overall, the test for proving a danger oftorture is substantially
less exacting than the proof required under the other relevant treaties.
This generous approach appears to be necessary, since Article 3 was

59
60
61

Zupandid, supra note 47, at 13.
BURGERS/DANELIUS, supra note 25 at 127.
Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden, Committee Against Torture,

Communication No. 41/1996, 9.5, U.N. Doc. at (1996), see also Kaveh Yaragh
Tala v. Sweden, Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 43/1996, UN.
Doc. CAT/C/17/D/43/1996 (1996) and Ismail Alan v. Switzerland, Committee
Against Torture, Communication No. 43/1996, UN. Doc. CAT/C/17/D/43/1996
(1996) and Ismail Alan v. Switzerland, Committee against Torture, Communication
No. 21/1995, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16/D21/1995 (1996).
62 Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada, Committee against Torture, Communication
No. 15/1994, U.N. Doc. A/50/44 at 12.3 (1995).
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created only as a safeguard against torture, one of the most severe
forms of persecution. 3
D. Absolute Prohibitionfrom Refoulement
The prohibition of"refoulement" under Article 3 is guaranteed
in absolute terms. Although the Convention Against Torture does not
contain any provision which expressly confirms the absolute nature
of Article 3, Article 2(2) provides, "[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency, may be a justification for
torture." This provision must be interpreted to apply to all the
provisions of the Convention Against Torture, including the
prohibition of refoulement in Article 3, because Article 3 is intended
to prevent torture in the country to which the individual may be
Accordingly, no exceptional circumstances justify
returned.
expelling a person to a country where she or he would be in danger
of being subjected to torture.' The fact that Article 33(1) of the
Convention on Refugees, which is subject to substantial limitations,"
served as a model for Article 3, also suggests that it was a deliberate
decision of the drafting committee not to adopt the limitations of the
Convention on Refugees.
E. ComplaintProcedure
Article 17 of the Convention Against Torture established the
Committee Against Torture which, among other functions, provides
for an optional individual complaint procedure modeled after the
63

Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden, Committee Against Torture,

Communication No. 41/1996, U.N. Doc. at (1996), see also Kaveh Yaragh Tala v.
Sweden,Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 43/1996, UN. Doc.
CAT/C/17/D/43/1996 (1996) and Ismail Alan v. Switzerland, Committee against
Torture, Communication No. 21/1995, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16/D21/1995 (1996).
6
ALLEWELDT, supra note 41 at 98; NATAN LERNER, The U.N. Convention on
Torture, 86 ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTs. 16, 126, 135, (1986); BURGERS/DANELIUS,
supranote 25, at 12.
65

See infra at Part IIA (3).
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Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'
According to Article 22, a State party to the Convention may declare
that it recognizes the Committee's competence to review and consider
communications that are brought by, or on behalf of, individuals who
are subject to the State's jurisdiction. In order to lodge an application
with the Committee Against Torture the applicant must have
exhausted all domestic remedies, unless such remedies are
unreasonably prolonged or are deemed unlikely to bring effective
relief to the victim. It is also required that the same application has
not been, and is not at present being, reviewed by another
international investigation or settlement mechanism." Applications
are further inadmissible if they are anonymous, incompatible with the
provisions of the Convention Against Torture, or are considered an
abuse of the right of submission of such communications. 9 The
Committee, however, cannot reach binding decisions; it only reviews
the petitions and forwards its opinion regarding the merits of the
complaint to the State party concerned and the individual." Primary
reliance is thus placed on the exertion of moral persuasion on the
State party involved."

I1. OTHER PROVISIONS RELATING TO NONREFOULEMENT
A. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status ofRefugees and the
Corresponding 1967 Protocol
The historic cornerstone of protection from refoulement can

6 Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,Inhuman or DegradingTreatment

or Punishment,17 B.C. Intl & Comp. L. Rev. 275, 322 (1994). For the complaint
procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see infra Part I D (3).
67 Convention Against Torture, supranote 10, Article 22 (5) (b).
68

See id. art. 22 (5)(a).

69

See id. art. 22 (2).

70

7'

See id. art. 22 (7).
See Lippman, supra note 66, at 325.
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be found in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The
Convention was entered into force in 1954, and has 132 parties to
date. A product of two world wars, it was the first instrument to deal
specifically with the protection of refugees worldwide.
The Convention's drafters' intention to expand the scope of
protection accorded by earlier international agreements relating to the
status of refugees is emphasized in the preamble.72 The treaty also
grants much wider protection from non-refoulement than previous
instruments, which were generally designed for specific refugee
situations only.73 Article 33(1) of the Convention prohibits the
expulsion or return of any person who is recognized as a "refugee"
within the meaning of Article 1. According to Article 1A, the term
"refugee" applies to any person who:
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself to the protection of that country ......
Hence, Article 33 protects not only persons facing torture as under
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, but also a substantially
wider circle of persons facing persecution. The inclusion of the date
limitation in Article 1A(2) indicates that the Convention was created
for the protection of refugees from both world wars. Persecution,
however, did not cease after 1951. Refugees continued to emerge
72

In its exact wording the relevant part of the preamble reads, "[c]onsidering that

it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating
to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and the protection accorded by
such instruments by means of a new agreement." Convention on Refugees, supra
note 7, at Preamble.
7' See, e.g., Provisional Arrangement of 4 July 1936 concerning the Status of
Refugees coming from Germany, 171 LNTS 75, (entered into force August 3,
1936), quoted in STENBERG, supranote 9.
74 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7, Article 1 (A) (2).
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from different parts of the world, so the Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees was adopted. Article 1(2) of the Protocol provides
that the definition of the term "refugee" shall be applied within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention on Refugees, but the words
"as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951" were omitted.
Accordingly, the Protocol expands the definition to include refugees
emerging from any event before or after 1951.
Although some countries did not ratify the Convention on
Refugees, they became party to the Protocol. Since the Protocol
essentially adopted and extended the Convention's protection,75 these
states have committed themselves to granting the protections
provided in the 1951 Convention, including the duty of nonrefoulement.
1. The Scope of Protection - Determination of Refugee
Status
The Convention on Refugees refers to persecution and does not
mention "torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,"
as do most of the other treaties discussed in this article. To be
eligible for protection under the Convention on Refugees a person
must be recognized as a "refugee." Persons are "refugees" if they
meet four requirements: (a) they must have a well-founded fear of
persecution; (b) the persecution feared must be based on one of five
reasons (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion); (c) they must be outside their country of
nationality, or, if they are stateless they must be outside their country
of habitual residence; and (d) they must be unable to return or, owing
to their fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that
country.
a. Well-FoundedFearof Persecution
The term "well-founded fear of persecution" contains the
75

See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 12, art. 1(1); see

also Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Toward a BroaderDefinition ofRefugee: 20th Century

Development Trends, 20 Cal. W. Intl L.J. 315, 319 (1990).
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subjective element of "fear" and the objective criterion of whether
'
this fear is "well-founded."76
The subjective element takes into
account the individual's frame of mind, which is strongly influenced
by his/her personal and family background; his/her membership in a
particular racial, religious, or political group; and his/her own
interpretation of the situation and personal experience. These factors
must be taken into consideration when determining whether the
applicant subjectively fears persecution."
The requirement that the fear must be well founded
complements the subjective element. It serves the purpose of
evaluating whether the applicant's concern has an objective basis, and
thus excludes those persons whose fears are obviously exaggerated
or irrational.78 In determining whether the applicant's fear is well
founded, States parties must take into account the personal and family
background of the applicant, his or her background, influence, wealth,
or outspokenness.79 The UNHCR notes that while States parties are
required to evaluate the applicant's personal circumstances, the States
parties may, at their discretion, take into account the general situation
in the country of origin."0 The Convention Against Torture is far
more explicit in requiring the Committee Against Torture to consider
country conditions.8 ' Nonetheless, the Convention Against Torture
and the Convention on Refugees agree that the individual's
application need not be based on his/her own personal experience.
Under the Convention on Refugees, past persecution is certainly a
strong indication that the applicant's fear is objectively well-founded.
Any persecution suffered by friends or relatives, however, may also
justifiably raise a fear that the applicant him/herself may soon

76

UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING

REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES para. 38, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/Eng/REV.2

(1992) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
77 See id. para.41.
78 See STENBERG, supra note 9, at 51.
79 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 76 paras. 41, 43.
'o Id. para. 42.
81 Convention Against Torture, supra note 10, art. 3(2).
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become a victim. 2
A central issue in the determination of refugee status is how
to define what treatment qualifies as persecution. Article 33 of the
Convention on Refugees affords some help, in that it provides that
threats aimed at the individual's life or freedom on account of the five
grounds enumerated in Article 1, constitute persecution. Most States
parties have accepted this definition as the necessary core of
persecution." The UNHCR further suggests that "other serious
violations of human rights would also constitute persecution." Since
torture often constitutes a threat at the individual's freedom and is
otherwise a serious human rights violation, there is no doubt that
torture qualifies as one form of persecution.
Neither the Convention on Refugees nor the UNHCR,
however, specify the minimum level of severity a treatment or
situation must achieve in order to qualify as persecution, as opposed
to mere harassment. The task of determining the dividing line
between persecution and harassment is left to the States; accordingly,
jurisprudence of the different countries lacks coherence and
consistency. ' Hence, Professor Joan Fitzpatrick criticizes:
Unfortunately, the elasticity of the definition of
persecution depends upon the political will of member
States implementing the Convention. In an era of
retrenchment and fear of incurring unbounded
obligations, the pattern at least in Western Europe, is
not adaption to new exigencies for forced migrants
but an insistence on outdated and restrictive
definitions of persecution. 5
The difficulty in defining the minimum level of severity
which treatment must reach to qualify as persecution is similar to the

83

HANDBOOK, supra note
STENBERG, supra note 9, at 48.

84
85

GOODWiN-GILL, supra note 4, at 67.
Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARv. HuM.

82

UNHCR

RTs. J.229, 240 (1996).

76, para. 43.
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task of defining a minimum level for inhuman or degrading treatment.
The Convention Against Torture has circumvented the problem
regarding non-refoulement since Article 3 applies only to the danger
of torture. That problem, however, does arise with regard to the
European Convention and the Covenant on Civil and Political
86

Rights.

b. Groundsfor Persecution
The Convention on Refugees identifies five reasons for
persecution, which would qualify an individual to be considered a
refugee. Persecution often arises from a combination of reasons. The
Convention on Refugees is far more restrictive in this respect than the
Convention Against Torture and other relevant treaties, which forbid
torture without any specification of a reason.
The term "race" in the Convention on Refugees is considered
to be applicable whenever a person is persecuted because of his
ethnic origin. Professor Goodwin-Gill suggests that the broad
definition of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, which includes all discrimination based on
"race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin," should also be
applicable for the purposes of the Convention on Refugees.87
Persecution for reasons of a person's religion can take forms
such as "prohibition of membership of a religious community, of
86
87

See infra Part IIB (1).
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 43. Article 1 of the Convention on the

Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination provides:
In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean
any form of distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
adopted 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
reprintedin 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
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worship in private or public, of religious instruction, or serious
measures of discrimination imposed on a person because they
religion or belong to a particular religious
practice their
88
community.
Persecution on grounds of nationality is interpreted to include
membership of particular ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic
communities.89 Persecution for lack of nationality, for example, that
of stateless persons, would also be included under this ground.'
The UNHCR defines a "particular social group" as a number
of persons who have similar backgrounds, habits, or social status.9 '
Many cases covered by this term also fall under other grounds of
persecution. The notion of "a particular social group" is broader than
the other grounds for refugee status and, as Professor Goodwin-Gill
notes, "possesses an element of open-endedness potentially capable
of expansion in favour of a variety of different classes susceptible to
persecution."'92 Reliance on the notion of a "particular social group"
has increased considerably over the last decade. For example,
Kurdish wives of politically active men were granted asylum in
Germany for being members of a particular social group based on
family membership.93 These women had not been politically active
themselves, so membership of a political group could not be
established as a reason for their persecution. In another case a
German Court also granted asylum to a Polish operator of a funeral
home who had been persecuted by the Polish Government due to his
involvement in a private enterprise." The granting of asylum was
supra note 76, para. 72; see also Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc.
88

UNHCR

HANDBOOK,

A/36/684 (1981).
89 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 45.
90 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, at 219.
9' UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 76, para. 77.
92 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 48.
93 See Judgment of July 2, 1985, No. 9 C. 35. 84, Bundesverwaltungsgericht
[Federal Administrative Court].
9' Judgment of March 29, 1985, No 17 K 10.343/83 Verwaltungsgericht
Gelsenkirchen [Gelsenkirchen Administrative Court] summarized in Maryellen
Fullerton, A ComparativeLook at Refugee Status Based on Persecution due to
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based on the applicant's membership to the particular social group of
private business owners. A woman from Trinidad who had been
abused by her husband for over 15 years, and had received no
sufficient protection from the police in Trinidad, was granted asylum
in Canada on the basis of her "membership of the social groups of
Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse."95
Further, persons can obtain refugee status if they are
persecuted on account of their expressed or implied political opinion.
c. Outside their Country of Nationality
Persons can obtain international protection from persecution
only when they are outside of their country of nationality and thus no
longer subject to the jurisdiction of their home country. Stateless
persons must be unable or unwilling to return to their country of
habitual residence and the persecution feared by the applicant must
relate to that country. 6 Similarly, Article 1(2) provides that persons
who have multiple nationalities must show a well-founded fear that
they would be persecuted in one of the countries of which he or she
is a national.97
d. Unavailabilityof Protectionof that Country
Furthermore, applicants for refugee status must be unable or
unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.
Inability refers to an objective state, for example, if the country
concerned is in a state of civil war and cannot guarantee the necessary
protection to the applicant.98 Unwillingness, although a subjective
state of the applicant's mind, is generally justified by the objective
finding that the fear of persecution is "well-founded.""
Membership in a ParticularSocial Group, 26 Cornell Int'l L. J. 505, 532 (1993).
95 Meyers v. Canada (M.E.I.) [1993] 97 D.L.R. 4th 729, 1 F.C. 154.
96
Note the difference from all the other conventions: None of these treaties
makes it a requirement that the applicant be outside her/his country of nationality.
For cases other than those involving extradition the practical relevance of this
difference, however, is very small. See discussion infra Part IV A (4).
9' UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at para. 106.
98 See id. para 97.
99

Id.

para 100.
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e. Official Persecution
While the Convention Against Torture principally provides
for protection from "official" torture, the Convention on Refugees
does not mention whether the persecutor has to be an agent of a state
or whether persons will also be protected from abuse by private
actors. Scholars and States parties have concluded that acts of private
groups should also qualify as persecution if governments are unable
or reluctant to suppress such acts.' 0 In such situations, applicants
may be unable to avail themselves of governmental protection, even
if the government itself has not been the agent of persecution.
Likewise, the UNHCR concluded:
Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts
are committed by the local populace, they can be
considered as persecution if they are knowingly
tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse,
or prove unable, to offer effective protection.'
2. Expulsion and Refoulement
Article 33(1) of the Convention on Refugees forbids States
parties from expulsion or return (refoulement) of refugees. Apart
from the inclusion of"extradition" in Article 3(1) of the Convention
Against Torture, the wording of Article 33(1) of the Convention on
Refugees is nearly identical. This issue is discussed in greater detail
in Part II A of this article.
3. Limitations of Protection
The principal difference between the Convention on Refugees
and the Convention Against Torture is that Article 33(1) does not
provide for absolute protection from refoulement. First, there are
certain exceptions that prevent persons from obtaining refugee status
and thus qualifying for protection under the Convention, even if such
individuals are in fear of persecution for one of the enumerated
"' GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 73; 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN,
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

191 (1966).

1o1UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 76, para 65.
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reasons. Article iF provides that the Convention shall not be
applicable to persons for whom there are serious reasons to think that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity...,
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to
that country as a refugee;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes
102
of the United Nations.
The UNHCR notes that when applying this exclusion clause,
the authorities must balance the degree of persecution feared by the
applicant against the severity of the crime. Exclusion from refugee
status of a person who fears persecution that would likely endanger
his or her life, would only be justified if he or she had committed a
particularly severe crime. 3
In addition to this general limitation on the recognition of
refugee status, Article 33(2) provides for a specific limitation of
protection from refoulement. Under this provision even a person who
has been recognized as a refugee may not claim the benefit of Article
33(1) if "there are reasonable grounds for regarding [him] as a
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted ...

of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a

danger to the community of that country."'
There is a great disparity between the different treaties
regarding the limitations they impose upon the prohibition from
refoulement. Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture absolutely
forbids refoulement without limitation; Articles IF and 33(2) of the
Convention on Refugees contain numerous substantive limitations.
This disparity will be discussed further under Part IV, where the
provisions of the other instruments will also be taken into account.

103

Convention on Refugees, supranote 7, art. 1(F).
TJNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 76, para. 156.

104

Convention on Refugees, supranote 7, art. 33 (2).
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4. Complaint Procedures
Unlike the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on
Refugees does not provide for an international body to supervise its
implementation. Although Article 38 of the Convention on Refugees
provides that disputes between States parties relating to its
interpretation may be brought before the International Court of
Justice, no procedure for individual complaints is available. But the
provisions of the Convention on Refugees serve in most countries as
the primary basis for domestic asylum and refugee law. Hence,
despite the lack of an international body, individuals should be able
to bring their petitions to domestic courts. Professor Fitzpatrick has
pointed out that the degree of protection granted depends largely on
the "political will" of the States parties, since the criteria for
determining "refugee status" under Article 1(2) are so elastic that
much discretion is given to the States parties in implementing the
provisions of the Convention on Refugees.'
While the Convention on Refugees imposes primary
obligations on the States parties to comply with the treaty, the
UNHCR has a role in advising governments regarding their
compliance. Further, the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme (EXCOM) regularly promulgates
conclusions and decisions in regard to the protection of refugees,
which may be generally applicable or relevant to situations in
particular countries.

B. Protectionfrom Refoulement Under Article 3 of the European
Conventionfor the Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 6
Although the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not contain any
"' Fitzpatrick, supra note 85, at 240.

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, openedfor signature4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22, Europ. T.S. No. 5
106

(entered intoforce 3 Sept. 1953).
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specific provision granting protection from refoulement, Article 3 of
the European Convention provides that no one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Based
on this provision, the European Court of Human Rights and its
Commission have developed a body of case law which has become
a strong safeguard against any kind of forced removal of persons who
fear that they will be tortured or ill-treated if returned to their home
countries.
The European Commission of Human Rights considered the
relevance of Article 3 to expulsion for the first time in 1961. In its
admissibility decision in P. v. Belgium, the Commission stated that
"the deportation of a foreigner to a particular country might in
exceptional circumstances give rise to the question whether there had
been 'inhuman treatment' within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Convention."'' 7 In X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Commission referred to this principle and stated that
[S]imilar considerations might apply to cases where a
person is extradited to a particular country in which,
owing to the very nature of the regime . ..or a
particular situation in that country, basic human
rights, such as those guaranteed by the Convention,
might be either grossly violated or entirely
suppressed.' °8
The question of non-refoulement reached the European Court
of Human Rights for the first time in 1989 when it decided Soering
v. UnitedKingdom.'" Jens Soering, a German citizen, was accused
of murdering his girlfriend's parents in Bedford County, Virginia, in
March 1985. He fled to England where the English police arrested
him in July 1986. The U.S. Government requested Soering's
extradition and the prosecuting attorney swore an affidavit that should
,07P. v. Belgium, Application No 984/61, 6 Collection of Decisions 39 (1963).
'0'X v. Federal Republic of Germany, Application No 1802/62, 6 Y. B. 480

(1963).
109
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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Jens Soering be convicted of capital murder, the judge would be
notified that the United Kingdom did not wish the death penalty to be
imposed. Nonetheless, the European Court of Human Rights
concluded that, if extradited, there was a real risk that the death
penalty would be imposed. It held that Soering would run the real
risk of exposure to the "death row phenomenon" which, together with
his young age, mental condition, and "the risk of homosexual abuse
and physical attack," would constitute inhuman and degrading
treatment. In other words, Soering faced the possibility of a long stay
on death row, where he would be subjected to the "ever present and
mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty" as well
as other extreme conditions, including "the risk of homosexual abuse
and physical attack." In its reasoning the European Court of Human
Rights emphasized the absolute prohibition of torture and of other
inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court held:
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying
values of the Convention... were a Contracting State
knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture..
. . Extradition in such circumstances, while not
explicitly referred to in the brief and general wording
of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit
and intendment of the Article, and in the Court's view
this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to
cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the
receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by
that Article."'
The Court confirmed this decision in two cases in 1991,
further extending its rationale to any kind of forced removal of

11o Id.
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persons who feared ill-treatment in the country of return."'
1. The Scope of Protection
The European Court of Human Rights has not provided a
precise definition of the different sorts of ill-treatment proscribed by
Article 3. Rather, it has applied Article 3 in various circumstances
suggesting the meaning of "inhuman and degrading treatment" and
indicated that the treatment must reach a certain "minimum-level" of
severity in order to fall within the proscription of Article 3. This test
was first formulated in Irelandv. United Kingdom:
Ill-treatment must attain a minimum-level of severity
if it is to fall under the scope of Article 3. The
assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things,
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the
case, such as the nature and context of the treatment
and its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in
some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the
person concerned."2
Hence, the Court first considers whether under all the circumstances
the treatment reaches the "minimum level of severity." Once the
Court has found the "minimum level of severity," it determines
whether the treatment should be considered "degrading," "inhuman,"
or "torture."
The main characteristic of degrading treatment or punishment
is its humiliating effect on the individual. The Court considered
punishments to be degrading when they "aroused in their victims
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and
debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral

.' Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); Vilvarajah and Others
v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
"2 Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., 19 Y.B. European Cony. Hum. Rts.
516, 750 (1976); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
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resistance.""3
With regard to the required minimum level of severity, the
Court concluded that the humiliation involved must be other than the
usual element of humiliation connected with any given form of
punishment."'
In the Tyrer Case,"5 the Court found that the
punishment of a fifteen-year-old who was sentenced in a juvenile
court to three strokes of a birch rod on his bare posterior was
degrading within the meaning of Article 3. A later decision, CostelloRoberts, however, held that similar disciplinary measures by the
headmaster of a school did not reach the required minimum level of
severity."6 In that case, a seven-year-old boy had been "slippered"
three times on his buttocks through his shorts with a oibber-sole gym
shoe. In distinguishing Tyrer, the Court noted that Costello-Roberts
was punished in private, with his posterior covered, and no evidence
was adduced as to the effects of the punishment. Mr. Tyrer was held
by two policemen while a third administered the punishment and the
birching caused soreness for at least ten days. Accordingly, publicity
and suffering are important criteria for determining whether treatment
is "degrading." The Court noted, however, that treatment in absence
of publicity could still fit under this category, as it "may well suffice
that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes
of others.""'7
Although inhuman treatment or punishment is typically
"degrading" within the meaning of Article 3, the predominant
characteristic is the harm inflicted to the individual's physical
integrity. Accordingly, the required minimum level of severity is
higher than that for "degrading" treatment. Corporal punishment has
been held to be "inhuman" because it was premeditated, was applied
for hours, and caused "if not actual bodily injury, at least intense
physical and mental suffering to the persons thereto and also led to

Ireland v. United Kingdom Eur. Ct. H.R., 19 Y.B. European Conv. Hum. Rts.
516, 750 (1976) at para. 167.
"4 Tyrer v. United Kingdom 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) at para. 30.
"'

115
116

117

Id.

Costello Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) at para 32.
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acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation..." 8 The Court
noted in some circumstances that the mere threat of torture even if not
carried out, may constitute "inhuman treatment." ' 9
As the Court observed in Soering v. United Kingdom, the
death penalty does not constitute inhuman treatment per se, as this
view would be inconsistent with the clear wording of Article 2(1) of
the Convention. The conditions surrounding the death sentence, such
as "the manner in which it is imposed or executed, the personal
circumstances of the condemned person... as well as the conditions
of detention awaiting the death sentence," 120 may bring the sentence
under the proscription of Article 3.
The distinction between inhuman treatment and torture relates
to the difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted. In Ireland
v. UnitedKingdom the Court distinguished between the two concepts;
if the Court uses the term "torture," it thereby should "attach a special
stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering."' 2 ' In that case the Court came to the conclusion that the

"'

Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., 19 Y.B. European Cony. Hum. Rts.

516, 750 (1976) at para 167. In Tomasi v. France the applicant produced medical
evidence of the physical results of corporal punishment which attested to the
presence of bruises and abrasions. In its decision on admissibility the Commission
stated:
As far as the injuries are concerned, it should be noted that
although they might appear to be relatively slight, they
nonetheless constitute outward signs of the use of physical force
on an individual deprived of his liberty and thus vulnerable and
in a state of inferiority. Such treatment cannot be justified and
in the circumstances of the case, may be considered both
inhuman and degrading.
Tomasi v. France, 241-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
"' Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
120 European Convention, supra note 106, art. 2(1).
121 Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., 19 Y.B. European Conv. Hum. Rts.
516, 750 (1976) at para 167.
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combination of the five techniques'" used by the British police only
constituted "inhuman treatment," rather than "torture" within the
meaning of Article 3. It should be noted, however, that both torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment are forbidden by Article 3 and
that the European Court has extended the non-refoulement
implication of Article 3 to both sorts of ill-treatment.
2. Ill-Treatment by Public Authorities
Article 3 of the European Convention does not specify
whether the feared ill-treatment must be carried out by public
authorities. In Ahmed v. Austria, the Austrian Government took the
position that since the state authority of Somalia had ceased to exist,
the Somali applicant could no longer fear ill-treatment as prohibited
by Article 3 upon return. The Commission rejected that argument and
stated, "[i]t is sufficient that those who hold substantial power within
the State, even though they are not the Government, threaten the life
and security of the applicant."'"
Similarly, in HLR v. France' the Commission held that the
risk of ill-treatment by a powerful and structured criminal
organization in Colombia, against whom it was unlikely that the
Government of Columbia would be able to offer adequate protection,
was sufficient to qualify under Article 3.
This approach is consistent with the interpretation of the
Convention on Refugees that persecution should also include acts of
private groups, if Governments are unable or reluctant to suppress
such acts,"z but may be less consistent with the wording of the
Convention Against Torture." 6
" These techniques consisted of(a) wall-standing for periods of several hours at
a time; (b) hooding, i.e. covering the detainees' eyes with dark materials at all times
except during interrogation; (c) subjection to hissing noises, (d) deprivation of
sleep, and (e) deprivation of food and water; Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct.

H.R., 19 Y.B. European Cony. Hum. Rts. 516, 750 (1976).
" Ahmed v. Austria, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 278 at para 68 (1997).
124 HLR v. France, App. No. 24573/94, Eur. H.R. Rep. 745 (1995) (Commission
Report).
," See supra Part III A (1) (e).
126 See discussion infra Part IV A (2).
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3. Real Risk of Ill-Treatment
In Soering v. UnitedKingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights held that, "the decision to [return] a person may give rise to an
issue under Article 3 ...where substantial grounds have been shown
for believing that the person concerned.., faces a real risk of being
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
27
punishment."
The Court has emphasized the assessment of a realrisk, and
has not hesitated to reject applications on the grounds that such risk
was lacking. In assessing such risk, the Court found that historical
considerations might be taken into account, since they can shed light
on the current situation in the country to which the person is sent.'
The assessment of such risk must further be made at the time and on
the basis of information available when the person is to be sent to the
country where she or he may be at risk.'29 Hence, if the Court
receives information that the situation in a country has improved
since the time of the applicant's initial claim, these changed
conditions must be taken into account.
For example, in Cruz Varas v. Sweden, "' a Chilean national
claimed that expulsion by the Swedish authorities to Chile would
constitute a violation of Article 3 because of the risk of torture in his
home country. He further contended that he had already experienced
torture and would be subjected to inhuman treatment on account of
the trauma caused by the expulsion. The applicant reported that he
had been tortured in Chile by means of electric shock, sexual attacks,
and severe beatings. The Swedish authorities failed to comply with
a request from the Commission to withhold expulsion and they
deported Mr. Cruz Varas in October 1989. The applicant reported to
the Court that after his forced return to Chile he and his relatives had
been subjected to "persecution as may lead to torture." The Court
acknowledged that the applicant had been treated contrary to Article
3 before he came to Sweden. It also took note of the alleged ill127

161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) atpara 91.

Ahmed, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 278 at para 42.
129 Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1996).
130 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
'28
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treatment after his return to Chile. Nonetheless, the Court found that
at the time of expulsion there were no substantial grounds for
believing that Mr. Cruz Varas faced a real risk of being subjected to
treatment proscribed by Article 3. In rejecting Mr. Cruz Varas'
claim, the Court relied on the changed political situation in Chile and
noted that by the time of expulsion in October 1989 the country had
taken important steps towards the restoration of democracy and
31
respect for human rights.'
The Court has also held that the general situation in the
country of return, even if massive violations of human rights are
reported, does not in itself give rise to a claim under Article 3. The
applicant must always show the circumstances which put him or her
individually in danger of ill-treatment. In Vilvarajah and Others v.
UnitedKingdom, 132 the Court rejected the application of five Tamils

against their expulsion to Sri Lanka by the British Government. All
the applicants had experienced torture or other ill-treatment by the
Sinhalese forces and subsequently fled to England where they applied
for asylum. Three of the applicants reported ill-treatment following
their return to Sri Lanka. Applicant Sivakumaran was detained for
six months during which time he was tortured every four or five days.
Sivakumaran was beaten with an iron bar, subjected to electric
shocks, and hung upside down over a chili-fire.' The Court stated
that the ill-treatment derived from "random activities by the security
forces and did not indicate that the applicants had been personally
singled out for persecution."'34 The Court further stated that the
applicants, like all other Tamils in Sri Lanka, were exposed to the
possibility of ill-treatment. The Court relied on a statement by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that
it did not consider Tamils to be refugees under Article 1 of the 1951
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.' In addition, the
Court noted an improvement of the political situation in Sri Lanka.
See id. para. 86.
Vilvarajah and Others, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
3 See id. para. 43.
114Id. para. 141.
135Id. para. 140.
"'
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Although the Court admitted that there was still general instability,
the situation did not create a risk for the applicants, that was greater
than for all Tamils. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there had
been no violation of Article 3 with respect to the applicants' removal
36
to Sri Lanka.

1

It is not appropriate, however, to import the standards of the
UNHCR into the European Convention, because the criteria for
refugee status under the Convention on Refugees differ substantially
from the notion of "inhuman or degrading treatment" under the
European Convention. In this decision, Article 3 failed to fulfill its
primary purpose -- the protection of persons at risk of torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment -- because of the Court's reliance on
UNHCR standards and its strict requirement that the applicants must
be individually singled out for persecution.
It appears that although the scope of the protection from
refoulement in the European Convention is much wider than that of
the Convention Against Torture, since the European Convention also
includes inhuman and degrading treatment, the standard of proof is
much stricter under the European Convention. Hence, it seems that
some of the applications denied by the European Court of Human
Rights, due to a lack of a real risk of torture, could very well have
succeeded if they had sought relief from the Committee Against
37

Torture.1

4. The Absolute Character of Article 3
Under Article 3 of the European Convention, torture and other
inhuman or degrading treatment are prohibited in absolute terms.
According to Article 15(2), no derogation may be made from this
prohibition, even in times of public emergency threatening the life of
the nation.
In Chahal v. United Kingdom,' the Court decided that the
applicant's deportation to India would constitute a violation of Article
'36 See id. para. 144.

See e.g., applicant Sivakumaran in Vilvarajah and Others, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A)(1991).
For further discussion of this issue see infra Part IV (5).
"' 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413.
'37

1999

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT

37

3. The British authorities had found that Mr. Chahal, a Sikh
separatist leader, was a threat to national security; his application for
asylum was refused and a deportation order was issued. The Court
found that Mr. Chahal, if returned to India, would face a real risk of
ill-treatment. In regard to the danger the applicant allegedly posed to
Britain's national security, the Court concluded that the absolute
nature of Article 3 also applied to expulsion cases. In such situations
it determined that, "the activities of the individual in question,
however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material
consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than
that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nation 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees."' 39 The European Court
confirmed this view in Ahmed v. Austria.'40 Mr. Ahmed, a Somali
national, was granted refugee status within the meaning of the
Convention on Refugees by the Austrian Minister of the Interior in
1992. Two years later, the Austrian authorities ordered the forfeiture
of his refugee status, and ordered his deportation based on the
applicant's conviction for attempted robbery and the danger he
thereby posed to the community in which he lived. The European
Court held that as long as the applicant faced a real risk of being
subjected to ill-treatment in Somalia, the applicant's criminal record
was immaterial as to his eligibility for relief from expulsion under the
European Convention.
5. Complaint Procedure
Until recently, the complaint procedure under the European
Convention had a tripartite structure. Complaints were directed to the
European Commission on Human Rights, which determined
admissibility and expressed its views as to whether the alleged
activity by a Member State violated the Convention. If it found such
a violation, the Commission referred the case to either the Committee
of Ministers or to the European Court of Human Rights.'4 ' This
"I Id. para. 2 (5).
140 24 Eur. Ct H.R. 278.
41 See FRANKNEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:

LAW, POLICY, AND PRocEss

479 et seq. (2nd ed. 1996).
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review procedure proved very time-consuming and was amended by
Protocol 11 to the European Convention, 4 2 which entered into force
on January 11, 1998. The most significant change under that Protocol
is the creation of a single permanent court to which all applications
can be brought directly.'43 Under the new rules it is no longer
necessary for the States parties to recognize the jurisdiction of the
Court. Rather, Article 34 of the Protocol obliges the States not to
hinder in any way the effective exercise of the individual's right to
bring claims before the Court.'"
In the first step in the process of bringing a claim, a committee
of three judges determines the admissibility of the application.
According to Article 35 the applicant must have exhausted all
domestic remedies and the complaint must be brought within six
months of the date from which the final decision of a domestic court
was rendered. The applicant cannot be anonymous and the issue
must not be substantially the same as that of any case previously
rejected by the European Court of Human Rights or the European
Commission. Once a case is declared admissible, it is referred to a
chamber of seven judges that encourages friendly settlement between
the complainant and the Member State.' 5 If such attempts prove
unsuccessful, the panel will issue a judgment. The applicant may
lodge a further appeal with a grand chamber consisting of 17 judges,
the admissibility of which will be decided by a panel of five judges
146
from the grand chamber.

While the Commission has been replaced by a larger, single
Court under Protocol 11, the Committee of Ministers still performs
Protocol No. 11 to The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 9 Oct. 1993, E.T.S. 155 (entered intoforce 11
May 1994).
41 See id. art. 34.
'44 Article 6 of the Protocol, however, provides that declarations made under
former Articles 25 or 46 limiting the recognition ofjurisdiction to events after the
date when the declaration was made, shall remain valid for the jurisdiction of the
new permanent Court, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 142, Protocol No. 11.
141 See id. art. 38.
142

146

See id. art. 43.
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part of its former duties in that it continues to supervise the
enforcement of judgments rendered by the Court. The Committee
possesses the authority to decide to expel a Member State from the
Council of Europe if that State refuses to comply with the Court's
decision. Although it has never exercised this power, it has helped to
discourage countries from disregarding the Court's judgments.' 7
C. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
The Organization for African Unity Convention Governing
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU
Convention) is another regional treaty dealing with the question of
refugees and, in particular, the principle of non-refoulement. The
OAU Convention entered into force in June 1974 and has been
ratified by 41 African States to date.' 48 Unlike the other treaties, the
OAU Convention was seen by its drafters as a complement to the
149
Convention on Refugees, rather than as an independent instrument.
Drafted in response to the increasing number of refugees in Africa, "
it adopts a much more generous position towards refugees and
reflects the ideal of solidarity and cooperation among African
States.' Article 4 (2) of the OAU Convention is particularly unique
in that it provides that the States parties take appropriate measures to

See NEWMANIWEISSBRODT, supra note 141, at 480.
Organization for African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
149 Article 8 (2) of the OAU Convention states, "[t]he present Convention shall be
the effective regional complement in Africa of the 1951 United Nations
Convention on the Status of Refugees." Id. art. 8 (2).
"o The Preamble of the OAU Convention states that, " 1. Noting with concern
the constantly increasing numbers of refugees in Africa and desirous of finding
ways and means of alleviating their misery and suffering as well as providing them
with a better life and future .... " Id. at Preamble. The Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, supranote 14.
148

See Jennifer L. Turner, Liberian Refugees: A Test of the 1969 0A U Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects ofRefugee Problems in Africa, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
'51

281, 282 (1994).
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lighten the burden of asylum granted by other States parties, where
such States experience difficulty in granting asylum to refugees.
1. The Scope of Protection
Article 1(1) of the OAU Convention incorporates the refugee
definition of the Convention on Refugees152 and expands it in Article
1(2) to:
Every person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of
his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
nationality."
This definition directly addresses the causes of massive refugee
influxes and links its broader refugee definition to actual root causes
of refugee movements."
M

2. Expulsion, Refoulement, and Non-Rejection at the
Border
Article 2(3) of the African Charter states:
No person shall be subjected by a Member State to
measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or
expulsion, which would compel him to return or to
remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity

152

Article 1 (2) defines a refugee as, "a person who owing to a well-founded fear

of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable ... to avail himself to the protection of that country." See supra Part
IIA.
151 The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, supra note 14, art. 1.
154 Turner, supranote 151, at 285.
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or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out
in Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2.1
Article 2(3) essentially parallels the non-refoulement provision of the
Convention on Refugees.'" Since the scope of persons qualifying as
"refugees" under Article 1 of the OAU is substantially broader than
that of the Convention on Refugees, the protection from refoulement
applies to more people. Furthermore, Article 1(2) does not encourage
the individualized refugee determination approach of the Convention
on Refugees. Instead, it takes a group approach to determining
refugee status for mass influxes of persons, due to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or other events seriously
disturbing public order. Accordingly, the OAU Convention makes
protection from refoulement no longer dependent on an
individualized threat of persecution in the country of return." In
addition, the States parties must refrain not only from returning or
expelling refugees already in their territory, but also from rejecting
them at their borders. Hence, it clearly addresses an issue which has
caused some controversy under the Convention on Refugees, and
was not specifically mentioned in Article 3 of the Convention Against
Torture.'
Article 2(5) goes a step beyond mere protection from
refoulement by providing a right of temporary asylum for persons
who have been denied asylum in cases where expulsion would be the
only alternative.'59 Article 5 of the OAU Convention further stresses
that no refugee may be repatriated against his or her will.

155 The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, supranote 14, art. 2.
156 See Convention on Refugees, supra note 7, art. 33 (1).
"7 See Turner, supra note 151, at 298.
158 For further discussion of this issue see infra Part IV C (2).

159 Article 2(5) reads, "Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any
country of asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of
asylum in which he first presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for
his resettlement in accordance with the preceding paragraph." Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, supra note 14, art.

2(5).
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3. Limitations of Protection
According to Article 1(5), the determination of a person's
status as a refugee under the OAU Convention is subject to the same
limitations as provided by Article 1F of the Convention on
Refugees."~ In Article 1(4 b), the OAU Convention adds to these
restrictions by stating that a person who has committed "a serious
non-political crime outside his country of refuge after his admission
to that country as a refugee or who has seriously infringed the
purposes and objectives of the OAU Convention"' 6 ' no longer
qualifies for its protection. Significantly, no reference is made to
persons who are regarded as "threats to national security" as Article
33(2) of the Convention on Refugees provides. 6 2
Because of its wide scope of application, Professor Walter
Knlin suggests that the OAU Convention is currently the instrument
that affords the greatest protection from refoulement.'63
4. Complaint Procedure
Like the Convention on Refugees, the OAU Convention does
not provide for an international body to which complaints about
violations of the Convention can be directed. Therefore, the degree
of compliance depends on the "political will" of the States parties in
implementing the provisions of the Convention as domestic law.
D. The InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights
Although not specifically expressed in the Civil and Political
Covenant, the Human Rights Committee has adopted the principle of
non-refoulement in its decisions regarding Article 7. Like the
European Court of Human Rights, it has interpreted the prohibition

See supraPart ]I A (3).
The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, supranote 14, art. 1 (4).
,62 Since the OAU Convention is intended to be a complement to the Convention
on Refugees, however, the individual is entitled to the protection of whichever
treaty provides the greater protection.
163 KALIN, supranote 9, at 53.
160
161
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of torture, cruel and inhuman, or degrading treatment to include the
prohibition against forced return of a person to a country where. s/he
faces such ill-treatment.'"
1. The Scope of Protection
Article 7 provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."'65 The
Human Rights Committee has issued very few decisions or views on
the issue of non-refoulement under this provision. In a number of
cases applicants have claimed that their extradition to countries where
they potentially faced capital punishment constituted a violation of
Article 7.' Another applicant alleged that he would be at risk of
torture if extradited to the requesting state. 67 The Human Rights
Committee, however, has failed to find any of these cases admissible,
since the applicants did not sufficiently demonstrate that the
anticipated treatment would be in violation of Article 7.
Article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant contains nearly
the same wording as Article 3 of the European Convention. It simply
adds the term "cruel" to the prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment. Since cruel treatment probably always qualifies
as "inhuman" or at least "degrading," this addition does not appear to
be an extension of the protection granted under Article 3 of the
"'4 The Covenant was entered into force in March 1976 and has 140 States parties
to date. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 15. For information regarding

signatory status, see <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/
ivboo/iv 4.html> (visited Nov. 13, 1998).
165 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 15, art. 7. Article 37 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child contains the same prohibition and may thus
be interpreted in a similar fashion. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted
20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49

at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), (enteredintoforce Sept. 2, 1990, reprintedin
28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
Joseph Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, U.N. Doc.
'66

CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993); Ng. v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1993); Cox. v. Canada, Communication No.
539/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993 (1996).

167 Torres v. Finland, Communication No. 291/1988, 2 Off. Rec. Human Rights
Committee, Supp No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990).
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European Convention. In view of this similarity in wording, it is not
surprising that the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee
regarding non-refoulement closely resembles the approach of the
European Court of Human Rights. In Kindler v. Canada, the
Committee reasoned, "[i]f a State party extradites a person within its
jurisdiction in circumstances such that as a result there is a real risk
that his or her rights under the Covenant will be violated in another
jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the
Covenant."' The Committee uses precisely the same terminology as
the European Court in determining that the applicant must be at "real
risk" of ill-treatment. Accordingly, Alleweldt concludes that it is
appropriate to interpret Article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant
in the same way as Article 3 of the European Convention.69
Similarly, Professor Manfred Nowak in his treatise consistently uses
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in order to interpret

16'

Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, Human Rights Committee,

U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1990 at para 13.2 (1993). The Committee relied in
this case on the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering. v.
United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 439 (1989) (holding that in the light
of the youth and the mental state of the applicant as well as the conditions on death
row in the Virginia prison system, the extradition and thus the applicant's exposure
to the "death row phenomenon" would constitute inhuman and degrading
treatment.) See supra part III B. With regard to Mr. Kindler, however, the
Committee held that the applicant was an adult and no other distinguishing factors
were identified. It further concluded that "prolonged detention under a severe
custodial regime on death row cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment if the defendant is merely availing himself of
appellate remedies" and that the extradition of Mr. Kindler, therefore, did not
constitute a violation of Article 7.
169 ALLEWELDT, supra note 41, at 101. The Human Rights Committee can also
review States reports as to compliance with the provisions of the Covenant,
including prohibitions against non-refoulement and other provisions parallel to the
Convention on Refugees. In its General Comment 20 on Article 7 (Forty-fourth
session, 1992), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev.1 at 30
(1994), the Human Rights Committee stated, "In the view of the Committee, States
parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their
extradition, expulsion or refoulement."
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170
Article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant.

2. Limitations of Protection
Like its counterpart in the European Convention, Article 7 of
the Civil and Political Covenant is also non-derogable. Article 4(2)
of the Covenant forbids derogation from Article 7 even in times of
public emergencies.
3. Complaint Procedure
Individuals may submit communications to the Human
Rights Committee alleging violations of the Covenant in regard to
States that have ratified the Optional Protocol to the Civil and
Political Covenant. 7' The criteria for admissibility are largely the
same as under the European Convention. The Civil and Political
Covenant expressly does not require of exhaustion of domestic
remedies if those remedies are unreasonably prolonged. That
limitation is only found in the jurisprudence, not in the wording of the
European Convention. According to Article 5 of the Optional
Protocol, if the Committee determines that the communication is
admissible and reaches a conclusion on the merits, it forwards its
views to the State party concerned and the individual. The decision
is not legally binding, but most States comply with the Committee's
findings."

170

MANFRED NOWAK, THE U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:

CCPR COMMENTARY 131 et seq. (1993).

171 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered intoforce 23 March 1976).
172 ALLEWELDT, supra note 41, at 100.
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E. The American Convention on Human Rights
1. The Scope of Protection
The first phrase of Article 5(2)" of the American Convention
contains the same wording as Article 7(1) of the Civil and Political
Covenant. Accordingly, like Article 7 of the Civil and Political
Covenant, Article 5(2) of the American Convention should be
interpreted in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights as to violations of Article 3 of the European
Convention. "

In Article 22(8) the American Convention also explicitly
prohibits refoulement by stating:
In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a
country, regardless of whether or not it is his country
of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal
freedom is in danger of being violated because of his
race, nationality, religion, social status, or political
opinion.'
2. Limitations of Protection
Since Article 22(8) of the American Convention states that
The first phrase of Article 5 (2) provides: "No one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment," American Convention
on Human Rights, supra note 16, art. 5 (2). The American Convention entered into
force on 18 July 1978 and has 26 States Parties to date. Ratification information
is available from Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications (visited on March
16,1999), .<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basic%20Documents/enbas4.htm# >.
" ALLEWELDT, supra note 41, at 102. Richard Wilson has noted that over 300
cases in the Inter-American Commission have referred to the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights. Richard Wilson, Researchingthe Jurisprudence
171

of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Litigator'sPerspective,

(visited Nov. 13, 1998), <http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/iachr/first.html>.
Similarly, the Inter-American Court has interpreted the American Convention in
light of European human rights jurisprudence. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion: The
Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on
Human Rights, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. OC-2/82 ser. A No. 21982, arts. 74-75 (1982).
17' American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 16, art. 22.
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persons who fulfill its criteria may in no case be deported, its
protection seems to be guaranteed regardless of offenses the applicant
may have committed. On this point, the American Convention's
protection is wider than that of the Convention on Refugees and the
OAU Convention, but is consistent with the Civil and Political
Covenant, the Convention Against Torture, and the European
Convention.
Article 27 of the American Convention, however, creates a
substantial limitation on the protection against refoulement. It
indicates that States parties may derogate from Article 22 and other
provisions in times of war or other public emergency that threaten the
independence and security of the State party. A government faced
with a massive influx of asylum seekers may very well claim that
such a population movement threatens its independence or security
and thus Article 27 may be used to limit Article 22(8).
3. Complaint Procedure
Article 25 of the American Convention provides that
individuals have the right to recourse to a domestic court or tribunal
for protection against violations of rights under the Convention. If
this domestic recourse proves to be ineffective, the individual may
apply to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.'76 When
the Commission finds a violation of the applicant's rights under the
Convention, it may publish the resolution in its annual report to the
OAS General Assembly. For States parties to the American
Convention which have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights the Commission may refer
the matter to the Court." For governments which have not ratified
the American Convention, individuals may still apply to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights with respect to the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.178

176

See id. art. 44.

See id. arts. 33-73; see also NEWMAN[WEISSBRODT, supranote 141, at 444.
O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the
Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). See infra
"
171
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F. The African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
Article 5 of the African Charter provides that "all forms of
exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade,
torture, cruel or degrading punishment or treatment shall be
prohibited."'79
Although the African Charter's wording differs from the
provisions of the previous instruments, its content is substantially the
same. Article 5 of the African Charter could, therefore, be interpreted
in the same way as the European Convention, Civil and Political
Covenant, and the American Convention to forbid refoulement of
persons at risk of torture or other human rights violations under the
African Charter."' Article 5 contains no limiting clauses and its
rights are not made subject to provisions of national law.''
The protection from refoulement in the OAU Convention on
Refugees is far more specific and clear than the general provisions of
the African (Banjul) Charter. Hence, the OAU Convention on
Refugees may be considered lex specialisin this regard, but the two
treaties should be read in a consistent fashion. Although the African
Charter provides for a review mechanism for individuals, that
mechanism has not yet developed sufficiently to protect the rights
provided in the Convention.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
AND THE OTHER INSTRUMENTS
This section compares the various non-refoulement provisions

notes 204-6..
179The African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 19.
The African Charter entered into force in 1986 and has 49 States parties to date,
http://www.unn.edu/humanrts/instree/ratzl afchar.htm on November 13, 1998.
180 ALLEWELDT, supra note 41, at 103.
...But cf. Article 27 of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, supra note 17.

.2NEWMAN/WEISSBRODT, supranote 141, at 465.
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of the relevant human rights treaties and, where possible, seeks to
provide a uniform approach to protect individuals from torture if they
are threatened with forcible return, while at the same time seeking to
avoid conflict between governmental obligations. The analysis
focuses mainly on three principal provisions which reflect most of the
diversity in dealing with the norms of non-refoulement: Article 3 of
the Convention Against Torture, Article 33 of the Convention on
Refugees, and Article 3 of the European Convention. The other
instruments will be mentioned only where they particularly contradict
or add to the other provisions. Since Article 3 of the European
Convention and Article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant contain
almost the same wording and their interpretation is consistent, this
section primarily discusses the European Convention as to which
there is a better developed jurisprudence. This section refers to the
Civil and Political Covenant only with regard to criteria that
distinguish it from the European Convention. Unless otherwise
noted, observations about the European Convention are equally
applicable to the Civil and Political Covenant.
This section follows the same structure as the earlier parts of
the article. It first compares the scope of protection, followed by the
terms of refoulement, the limitations of protection, and the means of
implementation. This section concludes with the rules that govern if
a State is party to several treaties and a question arises as to which
one applies.
A. The Scope of Protection
1. The Terms of Ill-Treatment
The principal difference between Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture and the other instruments is its limitation of
protection from refoulement exclusively to cases of torture. In
contrast, Article 33 of the Convention on Refugees applies to any
form of persecution that is based on one of the five grounds
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enumerated in Article 1(2)." '
Article 3 of the European Convention and the other
provisions with the same wording, broadly prohibit torture and other
inhuman or degrading treatment. Based on this provision, the
European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission
concluded that this provision also extends to cases in which the
individual would face a real risk of being subjected to either torture
or other ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 in the country where the
person is to be sent. It appears, therefore, that the Convention
Against Torture provides a narrower protection from nonrefoulement, because the non-refoulement provisions of all of the
other instruments include a broader scope of ill-treatment. The
drafting committee evidently intended that narrow application of the
Convention Against Torture.'
The Convention Against Torture has a narrow approach
which may be justified because the Convention Against Torture
applies to one of the most severe forms of persecution and torture.
The Convention and the Committee Against Torture have developed
a very protective approach to determining whether the individual
faces a "danger" of torture, which is easier to establish than either the
"real risk" required by the European Court or the "well-founded fear"
under the Convention on Refugees. Also, the Convention Against
Torture imposes an absolute protection against refoulement in which
derogations are not permitted, as contrasted with the limitations under
the Convention on Refugees.
These factors require discussion in the following sections,
where they can be considered and weighed against each other, so as
to determine whether Article 3's restriction to cases of torture is
justified as the most straight forward, and thus protective norm of
non-refoulement.

83 See

supra Part I A. The OAU Convention has adopted the criteria of the

Convention on Refugees for the determination of refugee status in an even more
extended form, see supra at Part III C (1).
"4
See supra Part 11 (2).
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2. Official Acts versus Private Acts
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture provides that in
order to be recognized as torture, an act must either be inflicted by,
or with the consent of, a public official or by a person acting in an
official capacity.' Two of the principal authors of the convention,
Burgers and Danelius, justify that decision in the drafting process to
include only "official" torture, by suggesting that "[i]f torture is
committed without any involvement of the authorities, but as a
criminal act by private persons, it can be expected that the normal
machinery of justice will operate and that prosecution and
punishment will follow under normal conditions of the domestic legal
system. ,8 6
The other instruments contain a similar approach in that they
generally require that the threat of "ill-treatment" should stem from
the government of the country of return. In Article 1(2) of the
Convention on Refugees, this approach is expressed by the
requirement that, owing to his fear of persecution, the applicant must
be unable or unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of the
country of return. Nonetheless, the UNHCR and most scholars have
concluded, "[w]here serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are
committed by the local populace, they can be considered as
persecution ifthey are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the
authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection."'" In
HLR v. France,the European Commission of Human Rights adopted
a similar view in finding that the risk of ill-treatment by a powerful
and structured criminal organization in Colombia was sufficient to
qualify under Article 3, since it was unlikely that the Colombian
Government would be able to offer adequate protection.'88
While the Convention Against Torture places primary
emphasis on official acts of torture, it also forbids torture "with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity." Furthermore, the non-refoulement provisions
185Id.
186
187

18

BURGERS/DANELIUS, supra note 25, at 119 and 120.
ULNHCR HANDBOOK, supranote 76, at para. 65.

App. No. 24573/94, Eur. H.R Rep. 745.
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generally deal with situations in which the individual will either not
be protected by the Convention Against Torture in the country to
which he or she is sent, or where the government cannot adequately
protect against torture. In such circumstances, Articles 1 and 3
should be given a reading consistent with the broader approach of the
Convention on Refugees and the European Convention to protect
persons who cannot obtain protection from torture by governmental
or private actors in the country where they may be sent.
In the Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, Professor
Nancy Kelly recommended the use of the following factors for
determining whether a government is unable or unwilling to protect
the applicant from harm perpetrated by private actors:
1. Whether the applicant sought and was denied
protection by the government;
2. Whether the governing institutions and/or
governmental agents were aware of the harm to the
applicant and did nothing to protect her, or
3. Whether the applicant has other reasons to believe
that it would be futile to seek protection of the
89
government. 1
Although originally developed for asylum claims only within the US,
these criteria are consistent with the UNHCR guidelines on the
protection of refugee women" and should be equally applicable to all
of these instruments. In particular, the Committee Against Torture
should adopt these guidelines as a second step in ascertaining
protection against refoulement when a person is in danger of torture,
even if the torture would be perpetrated only by private actors "with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official."

189

NANCY KELLY, WOMEN REFUGEES PROJECT OF CAMBRIDGE AND SOMERVILLE

LEGAL SERVICES AND HARVARD IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROGRAM,
GUIDELINES FORWOMEN'S ASYLUM CLAIMS 2, 37, 52 (1994) quoted in NEWMAN
& WEISSBRODT, supranote 141, at 657.
'90 Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991).
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3. The Reasons for Ill-Treatment
The Convention on Refugees, the Convention Against
Torture, and the European Convention differ as to whether the torture
need be perpetrated for a particular reason in order to obtain
protection from refoulement. Under Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture any person can claim protection from refoulement,
if there are grounds for believing that he or she would be subjected to
torture upon return without proof that the anticipated torture would
be carried out for a certain purpose. Although Article 1 lists some
purposes for which torture may be perpetrated, this list is not
exhaustive."" Likewise, the European Convention does not make it
a prerequisite that the ill-treatment be inflicted for a particular reason.
In contrast, a person must be recognized as a "refugee" under
Article 1(2) of the Convention on Refugees to be entitled to
protection from refoulement under Article 33(1). Accordingly, the
individual must establish that the anticipated persecution is for at
least one of the five reasons enumerated in Article 1: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Hence, proof that the applicant will face persecution,
including torture, in the country of return does not suffice. Although
the five grounds are so broadly drawn as to include most purposes for
which persecution -- including torture -- may be committed, the
restriction to these five reasons leaves gaps which may be filled by
the other treaties. 1"
191 See BURGERS AND DANELIUS, supranote 25, at 118.
'9' For example, in Canada (M.E.I.) v. Ward, a member of the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA) was denied refugee status. The INLA had ordered him
to guard innocent hostages but he secured their escape when he learned that they
were to be executed. The INLA confined and tortured the claimant and sentenced

him to death following a court-martial held by a "kangaroo court." The claimant
escaped and sought asylum in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada determined
that the claimant's fear was not based on his INLA membership, that is, of a
particular social group, but that he rather felt threatened because of what he did as
an individual. The decision clearly demonstrates the difference between the nonrefoulement provisions of the Convention on Refugees and the Torture
Convention. Under the provisions of the latter the applicant would have received
protection, irrespective of the reason for which he was in danger of torture.
Questionable, however, is whether the treatment the applicant faced, would have
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It does not appear that one can find a consistent approach
between the Convention on Refugees's limitations to certain reasons
and the broader protections of the other human rights treaties against
refoulement for torture. This distinction might be justified by the
severe nature of the persecution at stake in the Convention Against
Torture and similar provisions in other treaties. The individual
should be entitled to the protection of whichever treaty regime
provides the greatest safeguards against refoulement.
4. Outside the Country of Nationality or Habitual
Residence
There is a relatively minor difference between the Convention
Against Torture and the Convention on Refugees in regard to persons
who might be sent to a country which is not their place of nationality
or habitual residence. Under the Convention on Refugees, a person
cannot be considered a refugee if s/he lacks a fear of persecution in
his/her home country or place of habitual residence. Accordingly, a
person who has a fear of persecution in a third country would be
disqualified from refugee status, if s/he can return home. Under the
Convention Against Torture, however, any person who is in danger
of being subjected to torture in a country can claim protection from
being sent to that country.
This difference is evidenced most clearly in the context of a
request for extradition to a third country. The Convention Against
Torture might provide protection against extradition of a person to a
country where s/he is in danger of torture and would not focus on
protections available in the individual's home country. The European
Convention'93 and the Civil and Political Covenant might also provide
protection in this context. Since extradition is not covered by the
Convention on Refugees, however, the requirement that the
individual fear persecution in his/her home country does not create
qualified as "official" torture. Canada(M.E.1) v. Ward, 103 D.L.R. (4t) 1 (1993),
summarized in Walter C. Long, Escapefrom Wonderland: Implementng Canada's

Rational Procedures to Evaluate Women's Gender-RelatedAsylum Claims, 4
UCLA WOMEN's L.L 179 (1994).
'93 See e.g., Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1989).
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any conflict.
B. The Assessment ofRisk
The provisions also apply different standards regarding the
level of risk that must be shown by a person in order to qualify for
protection.
The Convention Against Torture requires "substantial grounds
for believing that the applicant would be in danger of being subjected
to torture."' 94 As noted earlier, this test contains the subjective
element of "belief' by the Committee Against Torture and the
objective element that this belief must be based on "substantial
grounds." The test under the Convention Against Torture appears to
be very inclusive in comparison to the other instruments. First, the
analysis focuses on the danger of torture. Hence, the applicant does
not need to show substantial grounds for believing that he or she
would be subjected to torture, but only that he or she would be in
danger of being subjected to torture. The wording of Article 3 is,
therefore, clearly less exacting than both Article 33 of the Convention
on Refugees, which requires a well-founded fear of persecution, or
the test of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 3 of the
European Convention, which calls for a "real risk" of torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment upon return.
Secondly, the Committee Against Torture has set low
standards with regard to the objective evidence that must be
submitted as "substantial grounds" for the Committee's belief. It
appears that the main criteria would be the applicant's general
credibility. The Committee has emphasized that it would be
unreasonable and against the intention of Article 3 to require full
proof of the truthfulness of the applicant's allegations. 5 It has also
noted that since the primary objective of Article 3 is the prevention
of torture, "even if there could be some doubts about the facts as
adduced by the author, it must ensure that his security is not
See supra Part II.
19'
See Khan v. Canada, Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 15/1994,
U.N. Doe. A/50/44 at 46 (1995).
194
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endangered."'"
The Convention on Refugees also uses an objective and
subjective test for determining the required fear of persecution. The
subjective element refers to the individual's fear of persecution.
Different individuals may react to situations in quite diverse ways.
Hence, the individual must actually possess a fear in order to qualify
for refugee status. While the subjective criteria under Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture focuses on the Committee's belief, the
Convention on Refugees takes into account the applicant's frame of
mind first and determines in a second step whether the individual's
fear is objectively well-founded. 97 Hence, the Convention on
refugees requires a two-step analysis in which the individual can be
denied refugee status at either stage. The Convention Against Torture
is less exacting and focuses entirely on the Committee's assessment.
In some of its decisions the European Court of Human Rights
appears to have adopted the strictest standard in assessing the risk of
ill-treatment. Its analysis focuses solely on the "real risk of illtreatment." In assessing the "real risk" the Court has at times
inappropriately imported into its burden of proof tough refugee
standards as to the existence of "persecution" without looking at
reasonable fear of that persecution.'98 Indeed, all such imports from
refugee law are not appropriate, because they stray too far from the
196See id.

197 In Ponniah v. Canada (M.E.I) the Canadian Federal Court
of Appeal concluded
that the applicant has to establish "good grounds for fearing persecution" and
defined "good grounds" as being less than a 50 per cent chance but more than a

minimal or mere possibility. 68 F.T.R. 149 (1991). The United States Supreme

Court, however, found in I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,that the principal focus of the
test of "well-founded fear" was on the applicant's subjective beliefs. Therefore, the
Supreme Court concluded that as long as an objective situation is established by the

evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution;
but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility. 480 U.S. 421, 107
S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). These differences show the scope of discretion
the States parties possess in implementing the provisions of the Convention on
Refugees. Nonetheless, the tests applied in these refugee decisions appear to be
substantially stricter than the test of a danger of torture applied by the Committee

Against Torture. See id. at 1228.
'19 See supra Part Ill. B. 3.
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language of the European Convention itself.
C. Expulsion, Refoulement, and Extradition
1. Lawful Presence
The Convention Against Torture, the Convention on
Refugees, and the other treaties discussed in this article deal both
with individuals who have entered a country lawfully and those who
have entered illegally. The term "refoulement" applies to persons
who have entered the country illegally, as opposed to the terms
"expulsion" or "deportation" which address lawful residents. Both
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Article 33(1) of the
Convention on Refugees refer to "expulsion" and "refoulement" and,
therefore, include lawful and illegal residents. Likewise, in Chahal
v. UnitedKingdom,"9 the European Court of Human Rights decided
that the return of the applicant, who had illegally entered the United
Kingdom, would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention.
2. Rejection at the Border and on the High Seas
Professor Christian Tomuschat has suggested the following
interpretation of Article 3 with regard to persons who are rejected at
the border of a State:
Since the paramount objective is the protection from
torture, one will have to conclude here that
refoulement is to be interpreted in a broad sense as
comprehending any form of State action, including
rejection at the border. Article 3 [of the Convention
Against Torture] proceeds from the assumption that
governmental authorities surrendering a person to the
authorities of another State that habitually practices
torture would themselves become accomplices of the
crime of torture. In that perspective, the subtle legal

'99 Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413.
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distinction between returning someone who has
already put his foot on the territory of the desired host
State, and preventing another person from performing
that symbolic act becomes immaterial. °"
Precisely the same reasoning applies to the prohibition of refoulement
in the Convention on Refugees and the other relevant treaties.
Professor Tomuschat's approach, therefore, seems applicable for all
of the instruments.
A somewhat more difficult issue arises in regard to the
unusual circumstance in which persons are rejected on the high seas.
Ordinarily, international law would prevent governments from
stopping and searching for intended entrants in the ships of another
nation on the high seas. In the wake of political and economic
upheavals in Haiti, large numbers of Haitians fled their country and
sought admission to the United States. Pursuant to a 1981 agreement
between Haiti and the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted
vessels carrying Haitians, interviewed them briefly as to their reasons
for wanting to enter the U.S., and forcibly repatriated almost all of
them. The interdiction agreement provided that those aliens who
apparently qualified for refugee status would not be returned to Haiti.
It should be noted that Haiti was the only country with which the U.S.
had an interdiction agreement. On April 4, 1994, Haitian President
Aristide withdrew his government's agreement to stopping Haitian
boats on the high seas and President Clinton ordered that Haitians
would no longer be subject to interdiction without individualized
inquiry as to whether they qualified for refugee or asylum status.
In the much criticized decision of Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Article 33 of the
Convention on Refugees to have no extraterritorial effect with regard
to Haitians rejected on the high seas.2"' Professor Fitzpatrick has
Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS. L. J. 257,
259 (1992).
201 509 U.S. 155; 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125 L.E.2d 128 (1993). For criticism, see, e.g.,
200

Andrew G. Pizor, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: The Return of Haitian Refugees,
17 FORDHAM INT'L L. 3. 1062 (1994).

1999

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT

59

criticized that Supreme Court decision and noted that no other nation
appears to have so far used interdiction on the high seas in order to
stem a flow of asylum seekers. 2 The case was brought to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, which noted that Article 33
of the Convention on Refugees is not subject to geographical
limitations. 3 The Commission found that the practice of the United
States violated Article 27 of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man,2 4 which provides for the right to seek and obtain
asylum in foreign territory.2"5
3. Indirect Refoulement
In Motumbo v. Switzerland,2° the Committee Against Torture
ruled that the principle of non-refoulement also includes the
refoulement of persons to third countries in which they would run a
real risk of being returned to a country where they would be in danger
of being subjected to torture. This view should also apply to Article
3 of the European Convention, 0 7 the Convention on Refugees, and
202
203

Fitzpatrick, supra note 85.
The Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am.

C.H.R. 51/95, OEA/ser.L/V./II.95 doc. 7 rev. at 550 (1997).
204 See O.A.S. Res. XXX, supranote 178, art. 27.
205 The Commission did not find any violations of Articles 5 (2) or 22 (8) of the
American Convention, because the United States has not ratified that treaty. The
Commission, however, also found violations of "the right to life," "the right to
liberty," "the right to security of the person" pursuant to Article 1, "the right to
equality before the law" as provided by Article II, and "the right to resort to the
courts" pursuant to Article 18 of the American Declaration. The Haitian Centre
for Human Rights et al. v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 51/95,
OEA/Ser.L/V./II.95doc.7rev. at 550, para. 183 (1997) supranote 203, para. 183
et seq.
206 See Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc A/49/44, at 45 (1994).
207 Alleweldt has indicated that this view should also apply to Article 3 of the
European Convention. He suggested, however, that the prohibition of indirect
refoulement should only apply with regard to those countries that are not States
parties of the European Convention. See ALLEWELDT supranote 41, at 64. This
qualification should probably not apply with regard to other treaties in a global
context. Perhaps, Alleweldt was assuming that European countries would not
ordinarily violate their treaty responsibilities. Such an assumption may not apply
globally and even in Europe; Turkey has a practice of returning Iranians even
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other relevant treaties.
4. Extradition
Except for the Convention on Refugees, most of the
instruments include protection from extradition if the applicant faces
ill-treatment in the requesting countries. Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture explicitly forbids extradition, as well as expulsion
andrefoulement. The jurisprudence under the European Convention
and Civil and Political Covenant also includes extradition.20 8 Since
the Convention on Refugees does not apply to extradition, it is
particularly important that States parties to the Civil and Political
Covenant are forbidden to engage in refoulement regarding
extradition cases. Hence, even if governments are bound only by the
non-refoulement provisions of the Convention on Refugees and the
Covenant, they may not forcibly return a person at risk of torture in
extradition cases.
Since many countries are bound by extradition treaties, their
obligations under those treaties may conflict with their
responsibilities under the non-refoulement provisions of the
Convention Against Torture, the European Convention, and the Civil
and Political Covenant. On this issue, Professor John Dugard and
Professor Christine Van den Wyngaert suggest that extradition
treaties must be "trumped" in favor of human rights norms because
of a "two-tier system of legal obligations that recognizes the higher
status of multilateral human rights norms arising from notions ofjus
cogens, and the superiority of multilateral human rights conventions
that form part of the ordrepublicof the international community or
of a particular region." 20 9
though they may be killed or tortured in Iran.
208 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989);
Joseph Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/481D/470/1991 (1993).
209 John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition
with
Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 187, 195 (1998). Burgers and Danelius suggest
that governments when entering into such extradition treaties after ratifying the
Convention Against Torture clearly must refrain from assuming obligations that
would be contrary to the objectives of the convention. Burgers and Danelius
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Professor Kilin suggested an alternative approach for UN
treaties, with a similar result: Article 103 of the UN Charter provides
for the supremacy ofthe UN Charter over other treaties. 210 According
to Article 555(3) and 56, the Member States are further obliged to
respect and observe the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Every request for extradition that contradicts the nonrefoulement provision is, therefore, also in conflict with the Member
States' obligations under Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.
Hence, the principle of non-refoulement must prevail.2 '
D. Limitations ofProtection
The refugee treaties differ considerably from the other human
rights treaties to the extent that they allow limitations on the principle
of refoulement. The Convention Against Torture guarantees the
principle of non-refoulement as an absolute right granted to any
person in danger of being subjected to torture. 212 Likewise, Article 3
of the European Convention is absolute, and the European Court of
Human Rights has expressly noted that the restriction of the
Convention on Refugees should not be adopted for the purposes of
the European Convention. 13 The European Convention and the
Civil and Political Covenant contain even broader guarantees than the
Convention Against Torture because they apply not only to torture,

further contend that even previously ratified extradition treaties may well be
construed to have been supplemented by the non-refoulement exception provided
in Article 3. In addition, however, a reservation or declaration would be
permissible to Article 3 for a State that considers itself not to be bound by the
prohibition of extradition in the Convention Against Torture, with regard to
previously concluded extradition treaties. See supranote 25, at 126, 127.
210 U.N. CHARTER, art 103.

See KALIN, supra note 9, at 58. Kdlin also argues that the observance of
fundamental human rights has achieved the status of jus cogens. Since
fundamental human rights include the prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment, non-refoulement must prevail. Id. It appears difficult,
however, to establish the precise content ofjus cogens in this regard.
211

(D).
See supra Part III B (4).

212 See supra Part I

213
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but also to inhuman or degrading treatment.
The Convention on Refugees, in contrast, provides under
Articles iF and 33(2) a dual system that may prevent some persons
who have a well-founded fear of persecution from obtaining
protection from refoulement.214 It appears that under the provisions
of the Convention Against Torture and the European Convention
even a war criminal would be safeguarded from forcible return to a
country where he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
A war criminal would be denied protection under the Convention on
Refugees. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, however,
suggests with regard to Article IF:
In applying this exclusion clause, it is also necessary
to strike a balance between the nature of the offence
presumed to have been committed by the applicant
and the degree of persecution feared. If a person has
a well-founded fear of very severe persecution, e.g.
persecution endangering his life or freedom, a crime
must be very grave to exclude him.215
As previously noted, torture is such a severe form of
persecution that expulsion to a country where the applicant would be
in danger of being tortured cannot be justified under any of these
instruments . 2 6 This result, however, can also be achieved using the
balancing test proposed by the UNHCR. One might argue that no
crime is serious enough to justify forcibly returning a person to a
country where he or she would be in danger of torture or death.

See supra Part II A (3).
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at para. 156. While the UNIICR spoke
only about a balancing approach to Article 1F, the same approach should apply to
non-refoulement under Article 33(2). Article 33's prohibition of refoulement is at
least as significant a treaty obligation as the recognition of refugee status under
Article 1A.
216 See supra Part II (D).
214
215
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E. Implementation
Seemingly common throughout the treaties is the need for
fuller implementation in national law, including legislative measures
and procedures for application. Some of the instruments also provide
for an international body to review petitions by individuals.
The Convention on Refugees, in particular, requires national
implementation for two reasons. First, the Convention on Refugees
established the primary source of domestic asylum law. Second,
although the UNHCR can urge compliance in some cases, there does
not exist an international body to which individuals can routinely
complain and which can thereby regularly supervise the
implementation of the treaty. It may be that the Inter-American Court
and the Human Rights Committee may be used as mechanisms for
implementation of the provisions of the Convention on Refugees and
its Protocol.
F. The Relationship between the Different Instruments
In cases where one State is party to several treaties, the
question may arise as to which non-refoulement provisions should be
applied. There are many similarities between the various nonrefoulement provisions and relevant interpretations. Hence, a similar
result may be achieved under several of the treaties. Indeed,
wherever possible, the treaties with the same basic objective should
be read consistently with one another. In cases where a different
result is mandated, States should implement the treaty which gives
the greatest 217human rights protection to the individual from
refoulement.

Professor Kdhn suggests that- as with any other conflict of law, the principles
lex posteriorderogat legi priori and lex specialis derogat legi generali should
answer this question. KALIN, supra note 9 at 58. As a general tendency the later
agreements are more protective than the earlier ones. Since these treaties are
intended to protect the human rights of individuals, it is more important to give the
maximum protection available rather than necessarily to adhere to the lex posterior
and lex specialisapproaches.
217
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v. CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUE OF THE GENERAL COMMENT TO
ARTICLE 3 ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE IN
NOVEMBER 1997

The principle of non-refoulement protects persons from
involuntary return to countries where they might face torture or other
inhuman or degrading treatment. The Convention Against Torture,
Convention on Refugees, European Convention, Civil and Political
Covenant, and the other treaties discussed in this article incorporate
that basic protection, some on a more advanced level than others. A
uniform approach of interpretation seems possible on many, but not
all, points.
Most of the treaties protect against torture by private actors if
the government cannot or will not provide for protection. While the
Convention Against Torture might be read to exclude torture by
private actors, Article 3 should be construed consistently with the
other human rights treaties to protect against refoulement in a country
whose government is unable or unwilling to protect against torture,
even by private actors.
The various treaties seem to apply different burdens of proof
for obtaining relief from refoulement. The different formulations "danger of torture," "well-founded fear of persecution," and "real risk
of ill-treatment" - do not necessarily require different levels of proof.
They are, however, apparently applied differently by their respective
institutions. As a general rule, States parties and international bodies
should adopt the following approach: the more severe the illtreatment the applicant faces, the lower the required degree of
probability that the applicant will actually be subjected to such illtreatment. Hence, if the applicant faces torture or his life is otherwise
threatened, then the decision-maker should not require as exacting a
standard of proof to protect the individual from such egregious harm
as when the individual faces a risk of a less serious injury.
Although most of the instruments do not explicitly refer to
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rejection at the border, the uniform interpretation of all nonrefoulement provision should be broad, including not only the
refoulement of persons who have already entered the territory of the
receiving country, but also those persons still at the border or even
those interdicted at sea before they reach the shore.
On November 21, 1997, its nineteenth session, the Committee
Against Torture adopted a "General Comment on the Implementation
of Article 3 in the context of Article 22 of the Convention Against
Torture. ' 218 The Committee had never previously issued a general
218

Convention Against Torture, supra note 10, arts. 3 & 22.
In view of the requirements of article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment that the Committee Against Torture 'shall consider
communications received under article 22 in the light of all information
made available to it by or on behalf of the individual and by the State
Party concerned',
In view of the need arising as a consequence of the application of rule
111, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of the Committee
(CAT/C/3/Rev.2), and
In view of the need for guidelines for the implementation of article 3
under the procedure foreseen in article 22 of the Convention,
The Committee Against Torture, at its nineteenth session, 317th meeting
held on 21 November 1997, adopted the following General Comment for
the guidance of States parties and authors of communications:
1. Article 3 is confined in its application to cases where there are
substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of
being subjected to torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention.
2. The Committee is of the view that the phrase 'another State' in article
3 refers to the State to which the individual concerned is being expelled,
returned or extradited, as well as to any State to which the author may
subsequently be expelled, returned or extradited.
3. Pursuant to article 1, the criterion, mentioned in article 3, paragraph
2, 'a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights' refers only to violations by or at the instigation of or with the
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comment interpreting any of the Convention Against Torture
provisions.
Considering it is the first comment issued on Article 3,the
comment appears surprisingly brief on some points. It does not, for
example, contain any definition of the different terms "expulsion,
return (refoulement) and extradition., 219 Since the duties of States
parties to refrain from extradition under Article 3 may often conflict
with duties under extradition treaties, the inclusion of some guiding
principles as to which rule must prevail would have been beneficial.
Likewise, a clarification that Article 3 also applies to rejection at the
border or on the high seas might have avoided conflicts of the same
kind as have arisen under the Convention on Refugees. 220 As
previously decided in Motumbo v. Switzerland,22' the Committee
affirms the important interpretive expansion that Article 3 also
applies to indirect refoulement: the expulsion of a person to a
country, where he would be at risk of being returned to a country
where he would face the danger of torture.222 With respect to the
level of risk involved, the Committee provides that, while the risk of
torture "must go beyond mere theory or suspicion, it does not have to
meet the test of being highly probable. ,221 In terms of the applicant's
credibility, it appears that in its decisions the Committee has been
more precise and more protective of the individual than in its General
Comment to Article 3.
Furthermore, it may generally be observed that the Committee
Against Torture appears to have interpreted Article 3 without
considering the need to avoid unnecessary conflict with the relevant
non-refoulement provisions of the other treaties. As discussed above,
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.
The remaining paragraphs of the General Comment, that is points 4-9, are
precisely the same as points 12-17 of the Proposed Revision of the
General Comment set forth in the next part of this article.
219 See supra Part II (A).
220 See supra Part IV (c) (2).
221 See Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 at 45 (1994).
=2 In re H-M-V, Interim Decision (BIA) 3365, at para. 3, 1998 WL 611753.
2B id.para.
6.
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the Committee should attempt to interpret Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture in the light of the various non-refoulement
provisions, so as to avoid imposing potentially contradictory
obligations on governments. At the same time it should provide as
much protection from refoulement to potential victims of torture.
Accordingly, the following section of the article contains a proposal
for a revised General Comment to Article 3, which the Committee
Against Torture is urged to consider. Where possible, the wording of
the previous General Comment and the individual decisions of the
Committee Against Torture have been incorporated in the proposal
for a revised General Comment, as well as, where applicable,
guidelines for interpretation that have been developed for other nonrefoulement provisions.
VI. PROPOSED REVISED GENERAL COMMENT TO
ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT
1. Article 3 provides for protection from refoulement to a State in
cases where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person
concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. Article 3(1) refers to "expulsion," "return" (refoulement) and
"extradition." The intent of these three terms is to cover all possible
measures by which a person may be physically transferred to another
country where he or she faces danger of torture. "Expulsion" is the
forced transfer of persons who have legally entered the territory of the
receiving State. "Return" may refer to persons who have unlawfully
entered the territory of the receiving State. Since the primary
objective of this convention is to prevent torture and because Article
3 is intended to cover all possible ways by which a person can be sent
to a country where she or he is in danger of being subjected to torture,
Article 3 should be broadly interpreted as prohibiting the rejection of
persons at its borders and on the high seas. The provision likewise
includes the refoulement of a person to a third country where he or
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she would be in danger of being expelled, returned, or extradited to
a country where he or she would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.224
3. The inclusion of "extradition" may give rise to conflicts between
Article 3 and obligations that the States parties have assumed under
extradition treaties. States are clearly required to refrain from
entering- conflicting obligations after their ratification of the
Convention Against Torture. Obligations, which the States parties
have assumed under extradition treaties prior to their ratification of
this Convention, should be interpreted as being supplemented by the
non-refoulement exception provided in Article 3.
4. According to Article 3, no State shall expel, return, or extradite a
person to another State. Article 3 applies to all States and does not
distinguish between States as to which the individual may be a
national or may have been in habitual residence, and to any other
State. Article 3 likewise applies to all States regardless of whether a
State to which a person may be returned is party to this Convention.
5. There must be "substantial grounds for believing" that the
applicant would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon
return; the test contains both a subjective and an objective element.
The subjective element refers to the Committee's belief about the
existence of such danger. The Committee's belief must be
objectively supported by substantial grounds that justify that belief.
6. Article 3(2) provides that the Committee should determine
whether there are substantial grounds by taking "into account all
relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in
the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights."

Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 at
45 (1994).
224
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7. In taking into account all relevant considerations, the Committee
should assess the applicant's personal circumstances, e.g. his or her
background, influence, wealth, and outspokenness. The applicant
need not show that he or she would be tortured by reason of any
particular belief, race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, political opinion, or other specific
characteristic. Nonetheless, these characteristics may help to
demonstrate the circumstances that put him/her in danger of torture.
8. In addition to the applicant's personal circumstances the general
situation in the country of return must be considered. According to
Article 3(2) the general situation includes the existence of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights:
The aim, however, is to establish whether the
individual at risk would be personally at risk of being
subjected to torture. It follows that the existence of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations
of human rights in a country does not as such
constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a
person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture upon his return to that country; additional
grounds must exist that indicate that the individual
concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the
absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of
human rights does not mean that a person cannot be
considered to be in danger of being subjected to
torture in his specific circumstances.225
9. Article 3 does not place the burden of proof on the individual who
seeks relief from refoulement. The wording of the provision refers
solely to the belief of and factors that must be considered by the
Committee Against Torture or the authorities of States parties. The

=Id.
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individual merely has the burden of presenting sufficient information
from which the Committee or the authorities can establish a belief
that there are substantial grounds for a danger of torture. While the
applicant's information must generally appear credible, complete
accuracy is not expected. It is not uncommon for victims of torture
to be reluctant to provide information about their experiences of
torture. They may, for example, need to be interviewed several times
in order for the interviewer to develop sufficient rapport to encourage
the victim to tell what happened to him or her. Similarly, torture
victims may be reluctant to come forward until they are at great risk
of refoulement, for example, until a deportation order has been
issued. Hence, late allegations and inconsistencies should not raise
doubts about the general veracity of the individual's claim.
Accordingly, "even if there could be some doubts about the facts as
adduced by an applicant and the Committee Against Torture must
26
ensure that his security is not endangered.0
10. While Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture places
primary emphasis on official acts of torture, it also forbids torture
"with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity." Articles 1 and 3 should forbid
refoulement of persons who cannot obtain protection from torture by
governmental or private actors in the country where they may be sent,
because such lack of protection from torture constitutes acquiescence
of a public official. In order to assess whether an individual qualifies
for protection under Article 3 in such a situation, the following
factors should be applied: (a) whether the applicant sought and was
denied protection by the government; (b) whether the government
institutions where aware of the danger of torture and did nothing to
protect that person; and © whether the individual has other reason to
believe that it would be futile to seek protection of the government
from torture.

Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada, Committee against Torture, Communication
No. 15.1994, U.N. Doc. A/50/44 at 46 (1995).
226
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11. The prohibition from refoulement under Article 3 is absolute.
States parties may not refer to national security or criminal conduct
of the individual to deny that individual protection from refoulement.
The prohibition of forcible return (refoulement) of a person in danger
of torture is such a fundamental principle, there cannot be any
limitation or derogation.

Admissibility

2 27

12. The Committee is of the opinion that it is the responsibility of the
author to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility
of his or her communication under Article 22 of the Convention by
fulfilling each of the requirements of rule 107 of the rules of
procedure of the Committee.
Merits
13. With respect to the application of Article 3 of the Convention to
the merits of a case, the burden is upon the author to present an
arguable case. This means that there must be a factual basis for the
author's position sufficient to require a response from the State party.
14. Bearing in mind that the State party and the Committee are
obliged to assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing
that the author would be in danger of being subjected to torture were
he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited, the risk of torture must
be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion.
However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly
probable.2

27 The remaining paragraphs reproduce the Committee Against Torture's General
Comment. See supra notes 19, 218; see also supra text accompanying note 213.
228 This paragraph of the General Comment would be improved if it is
reformulated as: Article 3 only requires that the Committee Against Torture or the
authorities of a State Party find that there are substantial grounds for believing that
a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Future events can only
be assessed in terms of probability. The Committee Against Torture does not
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15. The author must establish that he/she would be in danger of
being tortured and that the grounds for so believing are substantial in
the way described, and that such danger is personal and present. All
pertinent infonnation may be introduced by either party to bear on
this matter.
16. The following information, while not exhaustive, would be
pertinent:
(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights (see article 3, par. 2)?;
(b) Has the author been tortured or maltreated by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity in the past? If so, was
this the recent past?;
(c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support
a claim by the author that he/she has been tortured or maltreated in
the past? Has the torture had aftereffects?;
(d) Has the situation referred to in (a) above changed? Has
the internal situation with respect to human rights been altered?;
(e) Has the author engaged in political or other activity
within or outside the State concerned which would appear to make
him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger
of torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited to the
State in question?;
(f) Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author?;
(g) Are there factual inconsistencies in the claim of
the author? If so, are they relevant?
17. Bearing in mind that the Committee Against Torture is not an

assess the probability that an individual will be tortured, but only whether the
person is in danger of being tortured. The more severe the ill-treatment the
applicant faces, the lower the required degree of probability that the applicant will
be in danger of such ill-treatment. Since torture is a very severe form of illtreatment, the probability of the danger of torture need only be relatively low in
order to qualify for relief under Article 3.
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appellate, a quasi-judicial, or an administrative body, but rather a
monitoring body created by the States parties themselves with
declaratory powers only, it follows that:
Considerable weight will be given, in exercising the
(a)
Committee's jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, to
findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned;
but
(b)
The Committee is not bound by such findings and
instead has the power, provided by Article 22, paragraph 4, of the
Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of
circumstances in every case.

